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Abstract 
 
BACKGROUND: There is a scarcity of international and Norwegian studies investigating the 
relationships inherent in a public-private provision of specialist outpatient care. Information 
on these relationships is needed in order to better organize the provision of care at the 
specialist level.  
OBJECTIVE: To investigate factors that explain total consumption, public provision, private 
provision and the possibility for substitution in a public-private mix provision of specialist 
outpatient care. 
METHOD: A Weighted Least Squares regression method that incorporates a “fixed effects” 
model for all health enterprises has been used to run the analyses. A comprehensive cross 
sectional dataset covering observations on health status, socio-economic status and supply 
side factors has been used as a proxy for establishing the need for specialist care. The dataset 
contains observations from all the 430 municipalities disaggregated into municipal, gender 
and age-group units. 
RESULTS: The number of general practitioners has an insignificant effect on the utilization 
of specialist outpatient care.  Personal income is important in explaining the use of private 
specialists but not the use of public specialists. Travel-time has a negative effect on the 
general use of specialist care. The share of the population represented by the elderly above 80 
years has an insignificant effect on the utilization of both public and specialist care. 
Immigrants from countries outside Western Europe have a strong negative effect on the use of 
specialist outpatient care. 
The potential for substitution exists between public and private specialists in the treatment of 
a broad amount of need-groups represented by different variables. However, the substitution 
effect is very weak as evidenced by the extremely low estimate values ranging from 0.000 to 
0.032. 
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1 Introduction 
The main aim of this analysis is to clarify what factors influence the demand for outpatient 
specialist health services. Additionally, the analysis seeks to explain the variation in the use
1
 
of outpatient specialist health services between public and private providers by testing 
whether there is any substitution between them. This will be done by disaggregating the 
provision of health services to the municipal level based on patients’ residence, age and 
gender, and then statistically testing different explanations for any observed variation in 
utilization of specialist health services. This will enhance the existing knowledge and body of 
research on public – private relationships and consequently fill an existing gap on these 
relationships at the specialist level.  
Previous studies on specialist services have found demographic and socioeconomic effects in 
the use of specialist services (Nerland and Hagen 2008; NOU 2008; Hagen 2009). Other 
studies have tested whether there is substitution between primary care and specialist care. For 
instance, Tjerbo (2009) finds no effect of General Practitioners capacity on the usage of 
specialist care; however he finds some effect of competition between GPs on the utilization of 
specialist ambulatory care. Hagen (2009) finds a very limited form of substitution between 
municipal health services and somatic specialist services. The substitution primarily concerns 
the elderly admitted to acute wards and those who have long-bed-days. However, these 
studies on usage, access or demand of specialist care have not disaggregated their analyses 
between private or public provision (Iversen and kopperud 2002; Iversen and Kopperud 2002; 
Iversen and Kopperud 2005; Midttun 2006; NOU 2008; Hagen 2009; Lafkiri 2009; Tjerbo 
2010). 
Some studies have analyzed the demand for and consumption of either public or private 
health care services e.g. (Iversen and kopperud 2002; Iversen and Kopperud 2002; Iversen 
and Kopperud 2005; Midttun 2006; NOU 2008; Hagen 2009; Lafkiri 2009; Tjerbo 2010). 
Others have investigated the relationship between primary and specialist provision of care 
(Nerland and Hagen 2008; NOU 2008; Hagen 2009). Midttun and Hagen (2006) have looked 
at political leanings and how they inform investment in either public or private specialists. 
However, there seems to be no studies done that either explicitly test the relationships 
inherent in a public-private provision of specialist services, or make use of a comprehensive 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis the term ‘use’ of specialist care will be used interchangeably with the terms ‘usage’ and 
‘consumption’. 
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data set to test the relationships. This might imply that assumptions are made that 
relationships detected at the primary care level - also apply to specialist health care services. 
Empirical evidence is therefore lacking on relationships between public and private provision 
of specialist care.  Additionally, the provision of specialist health services in Norway is 
organized in such a way that it could be said to encompass three tiers; Publicly provided 
specialist services, private specialists and a third segment made up of private specialists that 
have operating agreements  with Regional Health Enterprises. It is therefore interesting to find 
out what effect each of the tiers has on the consumption of specialist health care services i.e. 
to find out who uses which services? What factors can explain the choice of service provider? 
(Geography, age, education, income, preference, waiting times, monetary costs etc.). Is there 
substitution between private and public provision of specialist care? If not, is the relationship 
complementary? Or are there other explanations? 
The Norwegian health care system is built on the principle of equality of access. All the 
inhabitants have the same right and opportunity to access health care services regardless of 
their social status, economic status or geographic location. Consequently this means that the 
demand for healthcare is driven by need. However, need is unobservable and therefore cannot 
be measured directly. Conversely, we can observe the utilization of health care services and 
use that as a proxy for expressing need. Still, utilization may not give the correct picture of 
need because of the effect of other factors such as socio-economic status, health status, 
demographic characteristics and the accessibility constraints of health care services. The 
demand model used in this thesis will approximate need while controlling for factors affecting 
access and utilization. In this way, we will be able to determine factors affecting the use of 
specialist health care services and explain the variation between public and private provision 
of specialist health care services.  
Outpatient specialist consultations have been increasing every year while admissions and the 
length of hospital-stay have been decreasing. For instance, 2009 recorded an increase in 
outpatient consultations at public hospitals of about 25 000. In the same period, private 
specialists recorded an increase in outpatient consultations of 30 per cent (SSB 2010). This 
makes it interesting to investigate factors that explain the trend of increasing consumption and 
the variation between private and public specialists. We have therefore fashioned four 
dependent variables that can best explain the trends. The first variable will investigate total 
consumption of specialist outpatient care. The second and third variables will disaggregate 
total consumption into public and private segments. The last dependent variable will 
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investigate whether there is a possibility for substitution between public and private specialist 
outpatient provision.   
The data used for the analysis is cross-sectional and covers a period of two years (2006 and 
2007). The data contains a comprehensive set of observations on different socio-economic, 
health status and demographic characteristics aggregated at the municipal level. Every piece 
of observation contains an aggregate unit that covers observations from each municipality 
based on gender and different age groupings. In this way, we will be able to collate and 
identify all factors that may explain the use of specialist outpatient services in Norway. 
 
1.1 Thesis’ structure 
Section 1 has introduced the thesis. Section 2 discusses the institutional set up of the health 
care system in Norway. Section 3 covers the theoretical framework. Section 4 outlines the 
study method, data chosen for carrying out the analysis, the analytical tool and the empirical 
model. Section 5 presents the analysis while section 6 provides a discussion of the results. 
Section 7 concludes the thesis. 
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2 Institutional framework 
2.1 Goals and mandate of the Norwegian health system 
The Norwegian health care system’s principles of solidarity, equality and justice are in line 
with the core values of health care provision as identified by the World Health Organization  
(WHO 2000; Johnsen 2006). These goals include achieving better health in terms of improved 
health outcomes and distributing good health status amongst the population. Additionally, the 
health care system aims to achieve fairness and equity in the access of health care services 
and in the sharing of risk. Another goal is to ensure that the system is responsive to the 
expectations of the society in terms of respecting people’s dignity, autonomy and 
confidentiality of information(St.meld. 2002; Johnsen 2006).  
 
2.2 Organizational structure 
When compared to the centralized British NHS model, Scandinavian countries are 
characterized as having a decentralized model where local and county governments have an 
important role in the allocation of resources raised through taxes (Rice and Smith 2002). 
Decentralization is seen as a way of lessening bureaucracy, enhancing patient information 
access and improving the management of health care services. However, the Norwegian 
health care system has undergone changes from a decentralized to a semi-centralized NHS 
model following the Hospital Reform of 2002 (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006). As a result of the 
reform, regional health authorities were given responsibility over specialized care while the 
responsibility for primary care was transferred to the municipalities. 
The health care system in Norway is therefore organized under three levels; the national level, 
regional level and the local level. At the regional level four regional health authorities are 
responsible over the provision of specialist health care services. The local level is represented 
by 430 municipalities which in turn have the responsibility over both curative and 
preventative primary health care and nursing care (Johnsen 2006).  
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2.2.1 The national level 
The Ministry of Health and Care services has the overall responsibility at the national level. 
The ministry outlines the national policy and prepares proposals for legislation, monitors their 
implementation and assists the government in making decisions. Furthermore, the ministry 
has the overall responsibility for public health, mental, dental, rehabilitative care, emergency 
planning, pharmaceuticals, coordination, food safety, nutrition, molecular biology and 
biotechnology services.  
The ministry has the overall administrative responsibility over its subordinate agencies such 
as; the Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, the Institute for Public Health, the Board of 
Health, the Medicines Agency, the Patient Register, the Radiation Protection Agency and the 
Biotechnology Advisory Board. The ministry also has direct and indirect involvement in other 
ministries and agencies indirectly touching on health care services and personnel (Johnsen 
2006). In addition to having the overall responsibility over policy formulation and all health 
care service provision, the state is also responsible for financing and/or subsidizing of the 
education and training of health care personnel (ibid).   
 
 
2.2.2 The regional level 
According to the Joint Committee Report (2004, sections 6.4 and 7.1), “the organization of 
the regional health authorities and the health enterprises is unique to Norway”. This is 
because the regions principally perform dual roles concurrently i.e. the authority role and the 
enterprise role. On one hand the regions play a “care/sørge for” role in providing needed 
specialized care to the population in their regions, while on the other hand they act as 
suppliers and producers of specialized care since the regions themselves own the health 
enterprises (ibid).     
The Principal health policy objectives and frameworks which form the basis for managing the 
Regional Health Enterprises are decided at the national level by the government. The general 
manager and the executive board of each RHE are responsible for the day-to-day running of 
their enterprise. The Norwegian Act relating to the Specialist Health Services of 1999 
stipulates the organization and provision of specialist health care services (SSB 2010). The 
state owns the Regional Health Enterprises (RHEs) which are in turn responsible for 
provision of specialist health service at the regional level. Services provided by the RHEs 
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include; patient treatment, training of health personnel, research and training of patients and 
their relatives. The services are provided and organized under hospitals, mental health care 
institutions, multidisciplinary specialist substance abuse treatment centres, the ambulance 
service, emergency services, and hospital pharmacies and laboratories. The RHEs are 
therefore responsible in ensuring that health policy objectives, resolutions, plans and laws 
relating to health policy, research and education specified at the national level are fulfilled 
within their geographic area of responsibility (SSB 2010). Additionally, they are also 
responsible over specialist health services provided by for – profit and non – profit private 
institutions in accordance with regulations set out by the state (ibid). 
After the state took over the ownership and responsibility for the provision of specialist health 
services under the Hospital Reform of 2002, service provision was organized under five 
regional health enterprises. This changed on 1
st
 June 2007 when the Eastern Norway Regional 
Health Authority and Southern Norway Regional Health Authority were merged into one 
regional health enterprise; South-Eastern Norway Regional Health Authority. The four 
regional health authorities responsible for providing specialized care as of 01.01.2010 are; the 
Northern Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Nord) which has responsibility over 
465 621 inhabitants, a bed capacity of 4.4 beds per 1000 inhabitants and covers Nordland, 
Troms and Finnmark areas. The Central Norway Health Authority (Helse-Midt) is responsible 
for 673 364 inhabitants, has a bed capacity of 3.9 beds per 1000 inhabitants and covers the 
following areas; Møre OG Romsdal, Sør-Trøndelag and Nord-Trøndelag. The Western 
Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Vest) is responsible for 1 012 202 inhabitants, a 
bed capacity of 3.9 beds per 1000 inhabitants and covers Rogaland, Hordaland and Sogn OG 
Fjordane. The South-East Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse-Sør-Øst) has 
responsibility over 2 707 012 inhabitants, a bed capacity of 3.7 beds per 1000 inhabitants and 
covers Østfold, Akershus, Oslo, Hedmark, Oppland, Buskerud, Vestfold, Telemark, Aust-
Agder and Vest-Agder (SSB 2010). 
Within each regional health enterprise, hospitals and institutions were divided into a number 
of health enterprises. Several regional health enterprises have subsequently modified their 
internal organization while some have been closed down and new ones established (Johnsen 
2006; SSB 2010).  
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2.2.3 The municipal level 
There are 430 municipalities of varying population and geographical sizes in Norway 
responsible for the provision of primary health care and social services. The Municipalities’ 
Health Care Act defines the roles and responsibilities of the municipalities vis-à-vis provision 
of primary care and patients’ rights. For instance, all citizens have a right to access health 
services in their community. Municipalities are therefore responsible for the provision of 
services such as; Promotion of health activities and prevention of illness and injuries, 
including organization and running school health services, health centres, child health care 
provided by health visitors, midwives and physicians. Municipal health centres have a 
responsibility to offer pregnancy check-ups and provide vaccinations according to the 
recommended immunization programs. Additionally, the municipalities should provide 
general medical treatment (including emergency services), physiotherapy and nursing 
(including health visitors and midwives) (Johnsen 2006; SSB 2010). 
Unlike the RHEs, municipalities have a greater degree of autonomy in their provision of 
health care services. The main aim of primary health care provision by each municipality is to 
improve the general health of the population, treat diseases and deal with health problems that 
do not require hospitalization. Each municipality is therefore free to choose how best to serve 
its inhabitants in achieving the goals of primary care provision. Most of municipal spending 
on health care is geared towards somatic, nursing and mental health care interventions (ibid). 
Most of the health care providers at the municipal level are publicly owned which means that 
most of the personnel are salaried employees. However, GPs are in practice self - employed 
even though they are financed by the municipalities, the National Insurance Scheme (NIS)  
and out – of – pocket user fees paid by the patients (Johnsen 2006). 
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Figure 1: An overview of the Norwegian health system (Johnsen 2006; 2).  
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2.3  Public - private provision     
As part of their provider responsibility, RHEs can enter into long-term, binding framework 
agreements with private health enterprises and/or non-profit organizations in the operation of 
private hospitals, institutions and private specialists (Johnsen 2006; RHF 2006; SSB 2010). 
Each RHE can either produce health services internally, or buy them from other regions (or 
from abroad) or private specialists and institutions. The Patients' Rights Act stipulates that 
patients are entitled to choose which hospital they will be treated at. However, this is not 
always the case since the relationship with private hospitals, non-profit institutions and 
specialists is regulated by operating and sales contracts. These operating agreements and 
contracts are organized in such a way that all health services provided can be regarded as 
forming part of the region's regular health care. This means that statistics on activities and 
details on personnel, capacity and activity from private and non-profit institutions are 
collected and published the same way as state hospitals and institutions (SSB 2010).  
 
Figure 2: Patient pathways into and out of the specialist health care services (Iversen and 
kopperud 2002).                                                                                                
2.4 Financing of the health system 
The Norwegian health care system is primarily funded through state taxes. Municipalities are 
also allowed to levy taxes proportional to the income of their inhabitants. Regional health 
authorities are funded by the state through transfers in the form of block grants, earmarked 
grants and Activity - Based Funding (ABF) based on the DRG system and other fee – for – 
service arrangements. In addition to levying local taxes, municipalities’ health care financing 
is also supplemented by state grants, earmarked grants and user fee charges. User charges are 
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normally set by the state and subsidized by the Norwegian Health Economics Administratioin 
(HELFO) which is a sub-ordinate organization under the Directorate of Health (Johnsen 2006; 
NOU 2008). HELFO also has the mandate of administering individual reimbursements to 
patients, reimbursements to different health care providers and overall responsibility over the 
regular GP scheme (Johnsen 2006). 
Regional Health Authorities have an internal financing system that mirrors the state’s own 
transfers to RHAs. This means that the different health enterprises in each RHA receive 
funding that contains the following elements; an activity-based financing element, an in-
patient and out-patients payment scheme element, needs-equalization grants, other earmarked 
grants and an out of pocket user fee element. The needs-equalization grants are given in the 
form of block grants calculated according to diverse socio-demographic characteristics such 
as the age composition of inhabitants in each RHEs catchment area. Still, the needs-
equalization grant is not contingent on the health services produced. The user fee element is 
paid by the patient directly but only covers 2% of the total cost of treatment. Additionally, 
there are no out of pocket payments for inpatient specialist health care services 
(helsedirektoratet 2007). 
The funding of outpatient health services provision such as clinics, laboratories and radiology 
services is done through an ABF element. Payment of the ABF element is based on a tariff 
reimbursement system that is administered by the Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Organisation (ibid).  
The NIS manages the social insurance system which provides financial security in case of 
disability and sickness. However, contrary to the practice in other European countries, the 
NIS does not have a specifically defined “coverage package” for the health care system 
(Johnsen 2006; xiv). 
According to Johnsen (2006), the growth of Norway’s health expenditure is similar to that 
taking place in other developed western countries. This trend is explained by the increasing 
amount of the elderly in western societies, higher societal expectations about health care 
provisions and outcomes, growth in real GDP and the increased pace in implementation of 
new technologies in the health care sector. 
However, according to the OECD data and the European Health for All databases, Norway 
has the highest health care expenditure per capita amongst the Nordic countries ($5003) 
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followed by Denmark ($3540), Sweden ($3470), Iceland ($3359) and Finland ($3008). 
Norway’s spending is much higher than the OECD average ($3060) and it’s only second to 
the USA ($7538). The data is expressed in US dollars and adjusted for purchasing power 
parities (PPPs) – a method for comparing spending between countries through currency 
conversion that equalizes the costs of a given “basket” of goods and services. Among the 
Nordic countries, Finland has the lowest costs – which are even lower than the OECD 
average. Finland’s health care personnel are paid less than in the other Nordic countries which 
could explain their relative lower health care spending (Kittelsen, Anthun et al. 2009). 
Figure 3: OECD countries’ public and private health expenditure per capita (OECD 2010). 
 
It is important to note however, that cross country comparisons are often problematic. This is 
because definitions about what is covered and what is measured are often different from one 
country to another. For instance, personnel are calculated as man-years in Norway, while in 
many other European countries a “head count” measurement is done. In addition, figures are 
usually not corrected for differences in real income and other natural cost differences between 
countries. According to Johnsen (2006) and Jensen et al. (2010), comparison data should 
therefore be treated with caution. 
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Figure 4: Movement of funds in the Norwegian Health care system  (Johnsen 2006; 37) 
2.5 History of reforms 
The Norwegian health care sector has undergone tremendous change in the last decades. 
Numerous reforms have been carried out aiming at better organization, financial management, 
efficiency, increased patient role and better outcomes. The reforms have targeted the 
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provision of health care services at both the primary and specialist levels. The most recent 
reform is called the coordination reform which is in the process of being carried out. Some of 
the main goals of this reform  involve creating a clearer patient role so that patients can 
participate and cope better; reorganizing the responsibilities and roles played by primary and 
specialist providers in order to reduce the number of patients receiving interventions at the 
specialist level (substitution); providing financial incentives for better organization and 
quicker treatment of patients (Omsorgsdepartement 2008). However, some studies have found 
that the planned increase of GPs as a means of substituting the use of services at the specialist 
level does not have the desired effect (Perez 2010; Seim 2010).   
Table 1: Some major reforms undertaken from 1984 to 2004 adapted from Johnsen (2006). 
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3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 The relationship between need, demand and utilization 
A model depicting the demand for Specialist health services will enable us test the potential 
for substitution and any other relationships arising between public and private provision of 
specialist health services. The demand model aims to recreate the relationship of need, 
demand and utilization. In this way, we are able to correct traditional challenges such as 
information problems inherent in markets. In the provision of specialist health care services, 
this is done by modeling the coherence between health status, socio-economic characteristics, 
need, supply side restrictions and the consumption of the services. The basic model is 
provided in figure 5. 
Figure 5: The demand model for health care adapted from Carr-Hill et al. (1994). 
 
Need/demand is unobservable hence an underlying assumption is that perceived need/demand 
depends on the actual current health status of an individual in addition to current available 
medical technology. However, an individual’s health status and their ability to benefit from 
available health services may be constrained by other factors such as socio-economic status or 
demography (Carr-Hill, Sheldon et al. 1994; NOU 2008). In addition, usage of specialist 
services may be constrained by supply factors. For instance, so long as demand is greater than 
the supply of services, usage will be restricted by the available supply. Need is also affected 
by supply side factors such as the availability of preventative health programs which in turn 
limit the amount of need. These relationships can be summarized as; 
Need = Demand [if there are no supply side restrictions and there is perfect information] 
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Demand = Use [if supply > demand] 
The above relationships can be presented as an equation 
Ui = ƒ(Ni , Si , SDi , Ai)  
The degree of usage of specialist health care services (Ui) is a function of health needs (Ni), 
supply of health services (Si), socio-economic and demographic factors (SDi), and the 
perceived availability of the services (Ai). 
The above model can be simplified further because perceived availability is a function of both 
the supply of health services and variation in demographic and socio-economic factors (Carr-
Hill, Sheldon et al. 1994). The equation then becomes; 
 Ui = ƒ(Si , SDi) , Ni = ƒ(SDi)               Ui = ƒ(Ni , SDi) 
An additional model called fixed effects will be added to the main model in order to ensure 
that the relationship between need and use is measured correctly by removing effects of 
supply variation in different health enterprise catchment areas
2
. This will mean estimating a 
unique constant term for every health enterprise catchment area (j) and calculating their 
means. This enables us to go “within” each catchment area of a Health Enterprise and 
correctly estimate its unique (supply) characteristics, hence avoid ecological fallacy. The 
fixed effects model will be discussed further in the empirical model’s chapter. 
Figure 6: A simplified demand model for specialist care adapted from Magnussen (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Health Enterprises are responsible for providing specialized care to people living in their designated 
catchment areas. These areas may cover one or several municipalities. 
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4 Methods and data 
4.1 Study design 
As discussed in the theory section, the need for specialist health services and the supply of 
these will determine the type of utilization function.  However, since the need for health care 
is unobservable, proxies that determine need will be used. These include social economic and 
demographic characteristics.  
Small area cross-sectional data has been the main type of data used for analyzing the 
relationships between primary care and the consumption of specialist health care services 
(Iversen and Kopperud 2002; Midttun 2006; Midttun and Hagen 2006; Peter 2006; Atella and 
Deb 2008; Hagen 2009; Kalseth, Kalseth et al. 2009; Lafkiri 2009). This is mainly due to lack 
of availability of data at the individual level, as well as the resources involved in collecting 
such huge amounts of data repeatedly over a short period of time, and privacy/confidentiality 
and legal requirements. Tranmere and Steel (1998), argue that the use of small area 
(municipal level) data can be justified as being a rough approximation of individual 
characteristics. In keeping with this tradition, a cross-sectional dataset covering 2006 and 
2007 is used. Nevertheless, this dataset contains more detailed information across all 
municipalities than that contained in previous similar studies. For instance, every piece of 
observation represents an aggregate unit covering a specific municipality, gender and age 
group. Further, a comprehensive amount of explanatory variables describing socio-economic 
status, health status and supply side factors have been used. This is in addition to 
disaggregating all observations into 10 year level age groups (0 – 09, 10 – 19, 20 – 29 etc.). 
This will enable the capture of a more detailed picture of the unobservable relationships 
between private and public specialist services and hence enhance the predictive power of the 
findings. 
Norway is administratively organized under 19 counties and 430 municipalities. There are 
wide population and geographic variations between the municipalities. For instance, more 
than half of the municipalities have a population of less than 50 000 while only 12 
municipalities have a population of more than 50 000. In addition, Oslo which is the capital 
city, has a population of about 600 000 and is both a municipality and a county 
(regionaldepartementet 2011). Structural changes the last years have resulted in mergers, 
abolition and creation of new municipalities. Municipalities that have undergone these 
 19 
 
changes during the period of the study are excluded in order to avoid overlapping and missing 
observations bias. These include; Vindafjørd, Ølen, Frei, Aure, Sande, Tustna, Kristiansund, 
Sør-Varanger and Skjerstad. Additionally, Sirdal municipality has been excluded due to 
missing information of some variables. Municipalities whose boundaries were changed, or 
those that were merged with others before onset of the study period, such as Bodø (2004), 
Sande and Vanylven (2002), have been kept. 
 
4.2 Data sources and limitations 
Social economic data and data explaining supply side factors have been collected from 
Statbank Norway which is operated by Statistics Norway (SSB). The data covering the use of 
public hospitals has been collected from the Norwegian Patient Registry (NPR). Data on the 
use of private specialists has been collected from both the Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Service (NAV) and the Norwegian Health Economics Administration (HELFO). 
Originally, we intended to include data collected for the year 2005 in the analysis. However, 
due to limited amounts of data for most of the variables in the analysis, it was decided to drop 
observations from 2005.   
Individual level data is ideal for the type of analyses carried out in this thesis as it provides the 
actual individual picture of need and utilization (Peter 2006). The Norwegian Patient Registry 
is currently in the process of making available data collected at the individual level (Godager 
2010). However, data collected at the small area level and used in this analysis is the next best 
approximation of individual characteristics.   
Data representing people in the age group 50 – 59 is missing. We have therefore made an 
assumption that this group does not have significantly different characteristics from parts of 
the age groups 40 – 49 and 60 – 69. Ideally, it would have been better to have had the data 
and therefore avoid making assumptions. 
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4.3 Statistical analytic tool (weighted least squares regression) 
The main principle behind Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) is to minimize the sum 
of squared differences between observed values of the dependent variable (  ) and its 
expected value [E(  )]. However, the OLS procedure is inadequate for our type of data 
because it assumes a constant variance of residuals across all predicted independent values 
(homoscedasticity). This is because regression coefficients can have unduly large or too small 
ranges on the dependent variable. This then reduces the power of significance tests and 
produces inefficient estimates.  
Norwegian municipalities vary greatly in terms of population sizes. OLS estimation would 
therefore be inadequate because small changes in the regression coefficients of municipalities 
with smaller population sizes would be assigned bigger weights. Municipalities with bigger 
populations would be assigned smaller weights even though they might have stronger changes 
of the regression coefficients.  
Weighted least squares (WLS) regression compensates for the violation of the above 
homoscedasticity assumption by weighting each case differently. Hence cases whose value on 
the dependent variable correspond to large variation on the independent variable will count 
less while those with smaller variances will count more when estimating the regression 
coefficients (Newbold, Carlson et al. 2007; Hill, Griffiths et al. 2008). In our dataset this will 
mean that municipalities that have greater weight will contribute more in fitting the regression 
line. Rather than using OLS which minimizes the residual sum of squares; 
       ( )   ∑  (    ⃗     )
  
    
we instead use WLS to minimize the weighted sum of squares by including OLS as the 
special case where all weights (wi) = 1; 
   WSS (   ⃗⃗⃗ )   ∑ (     ⃗       )
  
    
In this way, the regressions carried out will be able to match the actual data in the regions and 
hence calculate an efficient maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) (Willet and Singer 1987). 
This is because the noise variance   
  at each measurement (i) = 1/  
 . 
The population in each municipality has therefore been weighed relative to the total 
population for all municipalities, over the analysis time period. Municipalities with bigger 
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population sizes such as Oslo receive greater weight and influence than smaller municipalities 
that have few inhabitants.  
A multiple Weighted Least Squares regression model will be constructed on four levels in 
order to explain variation on the dependent variables; total utilization of specialist care, public 
provision of specialist care, private provision of specialist care and a public/private mix 
provision of specialist care. 
4.4 Empirical model 
In general multiple regression models, the dependent variable ( ) is related to a number of 
explanatory variables (              ) through a linear equation that can be summarized as: 
   =  +       +       + …………..       + ei 
The Betas                represent unknown coefficients that correspond to the explanatory 
variables                this means that a single parameter such as (  ) will measure the 
effect of change in variable (  ) on the expected value of the dependent variable ( ) when all 
the other variables are held constant. In terms of derivatives the relationship can be 
summarized as: 
      
  ( )
    
  (                       )   
  ( )
   
  
The parameter ( ) is a constant term showing the intercept point. The parameter (n) is used to 
denote the number of unknown variables.  
As mentioned earlier, a fixed effects model is added into the regression model in order to 
enable us to go “into” each RHE catchment area and decipher variation within the health 
enterprises. This is done in two steps; disaggregating the error term to reflect specific RHE 
characteristics then computing the RHE catchment area means (Godager 2010).  
The error term (ei) therefore becomes ƙj + ej 
The regression equation for health enterprise (j) therefore becomes; 
    =  +       +       + …………..       + ƙj + ej 
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However, we know that (ƙj) could be correlated to some of the explanatory variables 
(problems of endogeneity). For instance, if the explanatory variable is age and (ƙj) is doctor 
density, we could assume that health enterprises with a larger share of elderly inhabitants, will 
have a larger share of doctors. To remove the effect of (ƙj) on (    ) we compute the HE 
catchment area mean. The equation then becomes; 
  ̅    + β ̅ + ƙj +  ̅ 
In order to remove the correlation of (ƙ) on (    ), we subtract the new model from the “true” 
model; 
     =  +        + ƙj + eij]  - [ ̅    + β ̅ + ƙj +  ̅] 
The final equation where (ƙj) has been removed and where both the variables (y) and (x) are 
measured from HE catchment area means, then becomes; 
     -  ̅ =  (      ̅) + eij  
Our empirical model will be done on four levels which mean that we will have four equations; 
I. Model testing the effect of explanatory variables (representing need and supply) on the 
total utilization of specialist health care services in Norway (      )   
        
              = wi [β1 + β2Needj + β3Supplyj + β4F4 + ej] 
 
II. Model testing the effect of explanatory variables (representing need and supply) on 
public provision of specialist care (    )  
    = wi [β1 + β2Needj + β3Supplyj + β4F4 + ej] 
III. Model testing the effect of explanatory variables (representing need and supply) on 
private provision of specialist care (     ) 
      = wi [β1 + β2Needj + β3Supplyj + β4F4 + ej] 
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IV. Model testing the effect of explanatory variables (representing need and supply) on the 
relationship between private and public provision (
    
     
) 
     
     
  = wi [β1 + β2Needj + β3Supplyj + β4F4 + ej] 
wi is a weight estimate that captures population variation in each of the different 
municipalities. 
β1 represents the constant term while the term (j) represents the HEs. 
The term ej represents the residuals 
F4 is a vector variable (fixed effects variable) that represents the health enterprise catchment 
area dummies and private provision dummies.  
Needj represents explanatory variables that explain need.  
Supplyj represents supply side explanatory variables 
 
4.5 fixed effects 
As mentioned in the previous section, it is usually impossible to capture all variables that may 
have an impact on usage of specialist care services. In addition,  Regional Health Enterprises’ 
specific characteristics such as level of efficiency, administrative routines, access to resources 
and services and the internal culture inherent in each health enterprise, may differ and 
consequently introduce differing supply side restrictions on the levels of specialist health 
services provided. As mentioned previously, a fixed effects model enables us to go “within” 
each health enterprise and exclude any of these “unwanted” supply side variation components 
that are un-accounted for (Hagen 2009). This will be done through inclusion of all health 
enterprises (minus 1) as dummy variables. The excluded health enterprise will act as the 
reference unit. This practical method enables us to ascertain the heterogeneity present in 
municipalities within the catchment area of the different health trusts i.e. control for the 
average differences across the different health trusts’ catchment areas. This is in line with 
recommendations by Smith (2006) and Hagen (2009). Additionally, dummies representing 
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private provision will be used depending on the model being tested i.e. when testing the effect 
of needs and supply variables on public provision; we will use the dummy representing 
private provision. 
 
4.6 Statistical assumptions 
For the empirical econometric model presented earlier to function properly, some assumptions 
about the probability distribution of the error term, both independent and dependent variables 
have to be made (Newbold, Carlson et al. 2007; Pallant 2007). Assumptions made in this 
study are in line with the classical least squares regression assumptions. For instance, in order 
to be able to generalize our results to other samples, a fairly large sample size of 
approximately 7000 aggregated units of observations per variable covering all the 430 
municipalities, male and female categories and having 10 year age groups has been chosen. 
Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables are highly correlated with each other 
while singularity occurs when one independent variable is actually a combination of some 
other independent variables. The Pearson’s correlation function will be used to correct for 
multicollinearity and singularity. Variables with a correlation value (r = .7 or higher) will be 
screened further. Diagnostic methods that will be used for screening include the Variance 
Inflation Factor value (VIF) and the tolerance test. The tolerance test measures a variable’s 
collinearity by setting the tolerance value using the formula (1 – R2). A very small tolerance 
(   ) indicates an almost perfect linear combination which dictates that the variable should 
not be included in the regression equation. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measures the 
impact of collinearity among the variables included in the regression model and is represented 
by the formula (1/Tolerance). The VIF value should always be greater than 1 but not more 
than 10. 
Abnormally high or very low scores indicate the presence of outliers which may have an 
undue effect on the results. If detected, the outlier effect will be corrected through screening 
and use of the standardized residual plots where observations with residual values above (3.3) 
or less than (-3.3), will be excluded from the analysis.  
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The assumption on homoscedasticity which states that the variance of the residuals about the 
predicted dependent variable scores should be the same for all predicted scores, has been met 
through weighting all the municipalities relative to their population sizes and through the 
inclusion of the fixed effects model in the analysis. This will enable us derive “true” scores by 
measuring correctly the specific RHE characteristics that differ from other health enterprises.  
Normality of residual distribution around the dependent variables has been checked using 
scatterplots. Even though all the independent variables are positively skewed (which indicates 
that scores are clustered to the left at their low values) the sample size is adequate enough to 
ensure that the mean will be approximately normally distributed as per the Central Limit 
Theorem (Pallant 2007).   
Two further assumptions have been made about the independent variables. The first 
assumption is that the independent variables are not random variables. This simply means that 
we know the values of the independent variables prior to observing their effect on the 
dependent variables. Secondly, we assume that none of the independent variables are an exact 
linear function of the other variables. This means that we assume no one variable is redundant 
and therefore avoid the problem of exact collinearity (Pallant 2007).  
 
4.7 The variables 
 Socio-economic and demographic variables  describing the need for health care services have 
been selected based on suggestions from NOU (2008:2) and practice from other similar 
empirical studies such as Nerland and Hagen 2008, Gravelle et al. and Carr-Hill et al. 
The utilization of health care services normally varies depending on the age, gender and place 
of stay of the population (Kalseth, Kalseth et al. 2009). In order to take account of this fact, a 
standardized rate has been created where one unit of observation represents municipality of 
residence, gender and any of the eight age-group levels. The rate is based on the number of 
outpatient consultations (our dependent variable) divided by the number of inhabitants of the 
municipality the patient comes from. This is then standardized per 1 000 inhabitants and the 
formula looks as follows: 
                              ∑ *(
   
   
)+      
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    = the number of outpatient consultations (S) for gender-and-age groups (i); i = 1, 
2….. 8, for area (k) 
    = the number of inhabitants (N) for the gender-and-age groups (i); i = 1, 2….. 8, 
for area (k) 
    = gender-and-age group standardized rate (i) for area (k). 
4.7.1 Dependent variables 
Total reimbursements (Total_utilization): the average total amount reimbursed to both 
public and private specialists in the years 2006 and 2007 as a share of the population, 
per 1 000 inhabitants. 
Reimbursement to public specialists (Andel_taksref_sum): the average amount 
reimbursed by the state to public specialists in the years 2006 and 2007 as a share of 
the population, per 1 000 inhabitants. 
Reimbursement to private specialists (Andel_refusjon): the average amount 
reimbursed by individuals upon usage of private specialist services as a share of the 
population in the years 2006 and 2007, per 1 000 inhabitants. 
Public – private mix (pub_priv): the amount of public specialists given the amount of 
private specialists and vice versa. As is the custom in Norway, the number of 
specialists is calculated in man-hours. Additionally, the variable is not standardized 
because population counts are found on both sides of the equation and therefore 
cancel each other out. The (pub_priv) variable will enable us to test whether there is a 
potential for substitution between private and public provision of outpatient specialist 
health care services. 
 
4.7.2 Explanatory variables describing need 
Different age groups as a share of the population: five variables have been created in 
order to test the effect of each age group on the dependent variables. These age group 
variables represent the share of the population (Andel_0_15, Andel_16_44, 
Andel_45_66, Andel_67_79 and Andel_80 og over) every year, per 1 000 inhabitants. 
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We assume that the utilization of specialist health services is greatest during infancy 
and when the population gets old. 
Disabled (Andel_ufør): the share of population disabled per year, per 1 000 
inhabitants. Additionally, three extra variables representing different age groups have 
been created in order to test whether age of the disabled person has an effect. The 
variables created are; (Andel_uføre18_39, Andel_uføre20_66 and Andel_uføre40_69)  
In line with findings by Hagen (2009) of a positive correlation between disability and 
use of specialist services, we assume that the higher the number of the disabled, the 
higher the use of specialist health care services. 
Population 80 years and above living alone (Andel_alenebo80): the share of 
inhabitants who are either 80 years or older living on their own and not in an 
institution per year, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume that the higher the number of 
people within this age group, the higher the usage of specialized care. This is in 
accordance with findings by Nerland and Hagen (2008). 
Divorces (Andel_skilsmisser): share of the population divorced every year, per 1 000 
inhabitants. We assume that the higher the number of divorcees, the larger the use of 
specialist health care services. 
Gross Income (Brutto inntekt): represents the average gross income of inhabitants in 
each municipality per year. In line with findings by Carlsen (2006), we assume that 
the higher the share of inhabitants there are with lower gross income, the higher the 
usage of specialist care services and vice versa.  
Mortality (Andel_dødelighet): share of population that dies every year, per 1 000 
inhabitants. In line with findings by Hagen (2009), we assume a higher mortality rate 
increases the utilization of specialist care services. Additionally, an extra variable 
(dødelighet_20_og over) has been created to enhance understanding on whether 
mortality distribution between children and adults, has varying effect on the 
dependent variables.  
Social rehabilitation (Andel_attføring):  share of the population undergoing social 
program trainings to enable them get back to work every year, per 1  000 inhabitants. 
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We assume the higher the number of this group is, the higher the utilization of 
specialist care services. 
Medical rehabilitation (Andel_rehab):  share of the population undergoing medical 
rehabilitation every year, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume the higher the number of 
inhabitants in this group, the higher the utilization of specialist  care. An additional 
variable for the age group 20 – 66 years (Andel_rehab_20_66) has been created in 
order to test whether there is a difference in the usage of specialist care between 
different age groups undergoing rehabilitation.  
Single parents (Andel_ensligeforsøgere): share of population that are single parents 
per year, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume that the higher the number of single 
parents, the higher the utilization of specialist care services.  
The Unemployed (Andel_arbeidsøkere): share of the population unemployed per year, 
per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume the higher the share of unemployed, the higher the 
usage of specialist care. 
Non-western immigrants (Andel_ikkevinnv):  share of the population representing first 
and second generation immigrants from countries other than Europe. We make an 
assumption that the higher the share of inhabitants in this group, the higher the 
utilization of specialist health care services. However, Peter C. Smith (2006) and 
Ingebretsen and Nergård (2007), document that similar groups of minorities usually 
under – consume health care services and therefore represent (unmet need) in society. 
Caution should therefore be practiced when interpreting results.  
Population with low education (Andel_kungrskole): share of population with only 
primary education per year, per 1 000 inhabitants. In line with the findings of Carlsen 
(2006), we assume that the bigger the share of population in this group, the higher the 
use of specialist services. In addition, the variable has been disaggregated further in 
order to get a better understanding of the distribution and effect of inhabitants with 
low education in different age groups and their utilization of health care services. 
This has been done by creating further variables representing the share of inhabitants 
with low education for the following age groups; 20 – 29 years 
(Andel_grskole_20_29), 20 – 59 years (Andel_grskole_20_59) and 30 – 59 years 
(Andel_grskole_30_59). 
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Psychological disability (Andel_psykuføre):  share of the population that is mentally 
disabled every year, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume that the higher the number of 
people in this group, the higher the usage of specialist services.  
Social benefit (Andel_sosialhjelp): share of the population receiving social 
support/benefits every year, per 1 000 inhabitants. Additionally, another variable 
describing people aged between 18 and 49 years in this group has been created 
(Andel_sosialhjelp_18_49). This will enable us to test any variation based on age. We 
assume the higher the number of inhabitants in this group, the higher the utilization of 
specialist care services.  
Child welfare services (Andel_barnevernstiltak):  share of the population receiving or 
using child welfare support every year, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume the larger 
the number of children in this group, the higher the usage of specialist care services.  
Sickness benefits (Andel_sykepenger):  share of the population receiving sick benefits 
every year, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume the higher the number of people on sick 
benefits, the higher the utilization of specialist care.  
Sickness leave (Andel_sykefravær): share of the population on sickness leave every 
year, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume the higher the number of people on sick leave, 
the higher the usage of specialist health care services. 
 
4.7.3 Explanatory variables describing supply 
Travel time to public hospital (reisetid_pub):  the average travel time measured in 
minutes the inhabitants use to the nearest public specialist hospital every year, per 
1 000 inhabitants. In line with findings by Nerland and Hagen (2008), we assume that 
the longer the travelling time, the fewer the utilization of specialist health care 
services. 
Travel time to private hospital (reisetid_priv): the average time measured in minutes 
the inhabitants use to the nearest private hospital every year, per 1000 inhabitants. 
Same assumptions as those made for (reisetid_pub) apply. 
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Private man – years (Andel_avtaleaarsverk): the average number of man – years for 
private specialists every year as a share of the population, per 1 000 inhabitants. We 
assume the higher the number of man – years, the higher the utilization of outpatient 
specialist services.  
Public man – years (Andel_offaarsverk): the average number of man – years for 
specialists working in public hospitals every year as a share of the population, per 
1 000 inhabitants. We assume the higher the number of man – years, the higher the 
utilization of specialist services. 
Travel distance to local hospital (kmloksh):  the average distance measured in 
kilometers (km) that inhabitants travel to the nearest local hospital every year, per 
1 000 inhabitants. In line with Nerland and Hagen (2008), an assumption is made that 
longer distances reduce the usage of specialist services.  
Travel distance to regular hospital (kmregsh): the average distance in km it takes the 
inhabitants to travel to the nearest regular hospital every year, per 1000 inhabitants. 
Same assumption as (kmloksh) applied. 
Travel distance to the central hospital (kmssh): the average distance in km travelled 
by inhabitants to the nearest central hospital every year, per 1 000 inhabitants. Same 
assumption as (kmloksh) applied. 
General practitioners (Andel_fastleger):  share of doctors in the population every 
year, per 1 000 inhabitants. GPs in Norway have a gatekeeping role which means that 
they play a role in controlling access to specialist health care services (Claussen 
1999). In addition, one of the main goals envisaged by the coordination reform was to 
increase the number of GPs and therefore enhance substitution between primary and 
specialist level care (Omsorgsdepartement 2008). We therefore assume that the higher 
the number of GPs, the lower the consumption of specialist care services. However, it 
is important to note that some studies undertaken in Norway have shown that 
increasing the number of GPs increases the usage of specialist services while 
weakening the gatekeeping role (Iversen and kopperud 2002; Godager, Iversen et al. 
2007; Nerland and Hagen 2008; Tjerbo 2010). 
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State grants (Andel_tilskudd): state grants given to specialists every year as a share of 
the population, per 1 000 inhabitants. We assume the higher the grants the higher the 
utilization of specialist outpatient health care services.  
 
4.7.4 Fixed effects variables (dummies) 
Health Enterprise dummies (hfbo07_first): dummies representing the 22 Norwegian 
health care enterprises’ catchment areas. These are; Sykehuset Østfold HF, Sykehuset 
Asker og Bærum HF/Oslo sykehusområde, Akershus universitetssykehus HF, Sykehuset 
Innlandet HF, Ringerike sykehus HF, Sykehuset Buskerud HF, Blefjell sykehus HF, 
Sykehuset i Vestfold HF, Sykehuset Telemark HF, Sørlandet sykehus HF, Helse Stavanger 
HF, Helse Fonna HF, Helse Bergen HF, Helse Førde HF, Helse Sunnmøre HF, Helse 
Nordmøre og Romsdal HF, St Olavs Hospital HF, Helse Nord Trøndelag HF, 
Helgelandssykehuset HF, Nordlandssykehuset HF, Universitetssykehuset i Nord-Norge HF 
and Helse Finnmark HF. The catchment area dummy variables (minus1) will be used to 
correct for supply side variation. The excluded dummy variable (Akershus 
universitetssykehus HF) will act as the reference
3
. 
Private specialists dummy (dummy_priv):  dummy variable that takes the value = 1 
when private outpatient specialist services are available in the municipality and the 
value = 0 otherwise. This variable will be used as a “fixed effects” measure to control 
for supply side variation when testing the effect of independent variables on 
utilization of public specialist services. We assume that the higher the number of 
private specialists in a municipality, the greater the utilization of outpatient specialist 
services. A dummy variable representing availability of public specialists has not 
been created because the Norwegian health system is a public-based system where 
public provision is the default ‘modus operandi’.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 For a list of the health enterprises and their assigned numbers, see the appendix table: 9.4 on page xii. 
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4.8 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 7 presents differences in utilization between public and private specialists while figure 
8 shows the population distribution with regard to health enterprise dummies. The Oslo, 
Asker and Bærum region (also the most populated region) consumes the highest amount of 
private outpatient services. Additionally, the difference in utilization of either public or 
private outpatient services is much more even in this region. All the other regions have an un-
even distribution of utilization where private outpatient care plays only a minor role compared 
to public outpatient health care services. A general pattern emerges where highly populated 
regions have higher consumption of private outpatient services. This is in line with findings 
by both Johnsen (2006) and Iversen and Kopperud (2002), who found that consumption of 
private specialists is higher in cities and higher in southern Norway (highly populated region) 
when compared to the north. 
 
 
Figure 7: Differences in utilization of public and private specialists
 
 
 33 
 
 
Figure 8: Population distribution with regards to Health Enterprise dummies. 
Descriptive statistics have been divided into dependent, independent, supply and age 
variables. This will enable us to compare variables in similar groupings, describe the 
characteristics of the data set and finally check whether the underlying assumptions we have 
made about the data, have been met. Information about the mean, trimmed mean, missing 
data, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis will be provided. 
The trimmed mean value is calculated by removing the top and bottom 5% observations in 
each variable and then recalculating a new mean value. When compared to the original mean 
value, the new trimmed mean enables us to check whether extreme scores (outlier values) 
have a strong influence on the mean. If the values do not have huge differences, then we can 
proceed with the analysis knowing that our assumptions are not violated (Pallant 2007). 
The skewness value indicates distributional symmetry while the kurtosis value indicates the 
distributional “peakedness” where a perfectly normal skewness and kurtosis distribution = 
value 0. According to Pallant (2007, 56) and Tabachnick & Fidell (2007, 80), positive 
skewness values will indicate positive skew where the scores are clustered to the left at their 
low values while negative skewness indicates a clustering of scores at the high end (right-
hand side of the graph). Further, positive kurtosis values indicate a distribution that is rather 
peaked (clustered in the centre) with long thin tails. Kurtosis values below 0 indicate a 
distribution that has too many cases in the extremes (relatively flat). However, our data set 
contains a large sample such that the sensitivity to skewness and kurtosis will not affect the 
analysis (Pallant 2007).  
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All variables (except gross income, travel time to either public or private institutions and 
travel distance to local, regional or central hospitals) have been standardized per 1 000 
inhabitants as a means of controlling the effect of population size differences. The gross 
income variable is measured at the individual level and therefore does not need 
standardization. The variables depicting travel times and distances give municipal averages 
that explain the variation inherent in each municipality in terms of supply/access; hence do 
not need standardization. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables; Total reimbursements specialist 
health care provision (Total_utilization), Reimbursement to public specialists 
(Andel_taksref_sum), Reimbursement to private specialists (Andel_refusjon) and  
Public – private mix (pub_priv) standardized per 1 000 inhabitants for the years 2006 
– 2009 for all municipalities (Valid N = 6799). 
Variable Mean Min Max Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Total_Utilization 1070.0652 37.55 22647.67 970.34625 7.365 104.477 
andel_takstref_sum 888.6867 26.98 21976.42 886.19084 9.109 142.092 
andel_refusjon 175.8203 .00 2057.22 245.60111 3.152 12.859 
pub_priv 18.7974 10.10 27.57 6.18865 .011 -1.279 
 
As expected, reimbursements to public specialists (888.6867) clearly outnumber 
reimbursements to private specialists (175.8203). As pointed out earlier, the sample size is 
relatively large such that we can assume normality even though the skewness and kurtosis 
values for the public-private mix are negative (-1.279) depicting a relatively flat distribution, 
and positive for the other two variables. Further, the sample size argument also applies to the 
5% trimmed mean output for reimbursements to public specialists = 801.2084, and the 5% 
trimmed mean for reimbursements to private specialists = 142.3991. The mean for the public-
private mix = 18.7974 (trimmed mean = 18.7914). This is very high as it shows that on 
average, it is 18 times more likely for one to use public specialists over private specialists. 
However, this is not unexpected since the Norwegian health system is mainly public. The 
table shows a minimum value of zero for private reimbursements. This is as a result of 
specialist health care services being provided 100% publicly in some small municipalities. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the needs variables; Disabled (Andel_ufør, 
Andel_uføre18_39, Andel_uføre20_66 and Andel_uføre40_69), Population 80 years 
and above living alone (Andel_alenebo80), Divorces (Andel_skilsmisser), Gross 
Income (Brutto inntekt), Mortality (Andel_dødelighet, dødelighet_20_og over)  , Social 
rehabilitation (Andel_attføring), Medical rehabilitation (Andel_rehab), Single parents 
(Andel_ensligeforsøger), The Unemployed (Andel_arbeidsøkere), Non-western 
immigrants (Andel_ikkevinnv), Population with low education (Andel_kungrskole, 
Andel_grskole_20_29, Andel_grskole_20_59, Andel_grskole_30_59), Psychological 
disability (Andel_psykuføre), Social benefit (Andel_sosialhjelp), Child welfare 
services (Andel_barnevernstiltak), Sickness benefits (Andel_sykepenger), Sickness 
leave (Andel_sykefravær) and Different age groups as a share of the population 
(Andel_0_15, Andel_16_44, Andel_45_66, Andel_67_79 and Andel_80 og over) . The 
variables are standardized per 1 000 inhabitants for all municipalities and cover the 
years 2006 – 2007. 
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Variables N Min Max Mean 5%T.Mean 
Std. 
Dev Skew Kurtosis 
 
Andel_0_15 6800 0 0 .01 0.0100 .009 5.126 44.775 
 
Andel_16_44 6800 0 0 .01 0.0100 .015 4.407 34.742 
 
Andel_45_66 6800 0 0 .01 0.0100 .013 3.310 18.874 
 
Andel_67_79 6800 0 0 .00 0.0000 .005 2.969 12.309 
 
Andel_80ogover 6800 0 0 .00 0.0000 .003 4.438 34.892 
 
andel_rehab 7645 0 8 .05 0.0200 .276 17.976 390.236 
 
andel_sykefrav 6800 0 0 .02 0.0200 .004 -.022 -.291 
 
andel_ufør 6800 0 0 .00 0.0000 .005 2.451 8.227 
 
andel_uføre_18_39 6800 .00 .00 .0025 0.0024 .00071 1.653 2.982 
 
andel_uføre_20_66 6800 .00 .06 .0007 0.0005 .00133 14.400 465.434 
 
andel_uføre_40_69 6800 .01 .02 .0142 0.0141 .00259 .576 -.052 
 
andel_alenebo80 7645 .01 .06 .0299 0.0297 .00922 .264 -.208 
 
andel_skilsmisser 7663 .00 .01 .0020 0.0020 .00081 -.088 1.366 
 
andel_dødelighet 7650 .00 .57 .0183 0.0170 .03856 2.923 12.146 
 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover 6800 .00 21.84 .0193 0.0001 .39157 34.617 1592.060 
 
andel_attføring 7630 .00 10.04 .0408 0.0156 .28711 21.721 572.560 
 
andel_rehab_20_66 6800 .00 .02 .0108 0.0107 .00343 .422 .309 
 
andel_ensligeforsørgere 7663 .00 .06 .0256 0.0255 .00644 .360 1.321 
 
andel_arbeidsokere 7648 .00 47.82 .1883 0.0812 1.34431 24.339 720.474 
 
andel_ikkevinnv 7650 .00 1.05 .0312 0.0237 .04237 6.838 115.170 
 
andel_kungrskole 6800 .00 1.16 .3469 0.0353 .16436 1.015 .847 
 
andel_grskole_20_29 6800 .01 .06 .0290 0.0286 .00769 .692 1.325 
 
andel_grskole_20_59 6800 .06 .28 .1275 0.1258 .03061 1.075 2.363 
 
andel_grskole_30_59 6800 .05 .23 .0986 0.0972 .02559 1.007 2.090 
 
andel_psykuføre 7596 .00 4.74 .0202 0.0069 .14062 23.081 631.447 
 
andel_sosialhjelp 7645 .00 18.17 .0632 0.0280 .48343 25.574 782.497 
 
andel_barnevernstiltak 7663 .00 .02 .0075 0.0073 .00258 .805 1.143 
 
andel_sykepenger 7646 .00 70.25 .2588 0.1100 1.61700 23.127 714.099 
 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 6800 .00 .06 .0232 0.0227 .00879 .947 1.831 
  Valid N (listwise) 5867               
 
The above table shows no significant difference between the variable means and the 5% 
trimmed means. This shows that extreme scores do not impact wrongly on our data (do not 
have a strong influence). However, the variable (andel_dødelighet_20ogover) has big 
differences between the mean (0.0193) and the 5% trimmed mean (0.0001). This could be 
explained by the fact that the top and bottom 5% quartiles of the variable represent a part of 
the population (the elderly and the young) that have a significantly higher death rate. The 
same is true for the variable (kungrskole) which has a mean= 0.3469 and a 5% trimmed 
mean= 0.0353. The difference might be explained by the fact that a bigger proportion of those 
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with low education are the elderly. Some municipalities have so few inhabitants such that 
some variables will have minimum values = 0.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the supply side variables per 1 000 inhabitants for all 
municipalities in the period 2006 – 2007. The variables are; Travel time to public hospital 
(reisetid_pub), Travel time to private hospital (reisetid_priv) , Private man – years 
(Andel_avtaleaarsverk), Public man – years (Andel_offaarsverk), Travel distance to 
local hospital (kmloksh), Travel distance to regular hospital (kmregsh) , Travel 
distance to the central hospital (kmssh), General practitioners (Andel_fastleger) and 
State grants (Andel_tilskudd) 
Variables N Min Max Mean 
 
5%T.mean Std. Dev Skew Kurtosis 
 
andel_avtaleaarsverk 6816 0 47,87 0,8686 0,6339 1,62761 8,826 151,662 
 
andel_offaarsverk 6816 0,05 706,67 14,1324 10,7405 24,78418 9,572 169,965 
 
Kmloksh 6816 0 567 69,11 60,27 73,047 2,518 9,647 
 
Kmregsh 6816 0 1005 238,1 222,38 177,515 1,305 2,162 
 
KMssh 6816 0 903 139,92 118,44 162,42 2,284 5,61 
 
reisetid_pub 6816 0 488 71,74 64,57 68,829 1,875 5,237 
 
Reisetidpriv 6816 0 372 55,63 48,6 60,598 1,845 4,634 
 
andel_tilskudd 6816 3,51 42314,67 758,1001 554,756 1417,837 9,014 159,077 
 
andel_fastleger 6816 0 0,8 0,0266 0,0273 0,03025 6,25 92,946 
 
Valid N (listwise) 6816               
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5 Results 
This chapter presents results on the utilization of specialist health services with the aim of 
explaining variation and the choice of specialist providers using four analysis levels; total 
utilization of specialist services, public utilization, private utilization and public-private 
utilization mix. Multiple regressions using Weighted Least Squares have been carried out. 
Interpretations will be based on output values for R
2
,    coefficients, F test values and the 
statistical significance values of each variable. The R
2
 describes the variation in our dependent 
variables that our models explain. The F test describes the significance of the whole model 
i.e. whether all the coefficients sum up to zero or not. The signs of the    coefficients indicate 
whether a variable has a positive or negative impact on our dependent variables. The 
statistical significance of each variable will be measured at 1%, 5% or 10% (p<0.01; p<0.05; 
p<0.1). This will enable us ascertain whether a coefficient is significantly different from zero 
(Pallant 2007). However, since we are interested in studying the choice and variation in use of 
specialist outpatient services, it is important to note that we are mostly interested in the 
coefficients and the direction they are pointing towards. The units of measurement for the 
coefficients contain a cell that represents municipalities, gender and eight age group 
observations each. 
The models presented in this chapter represent the final models after highly correlated 
variables have been dropped. All the explanatory variables explaining need and supply were 
included in the preceding models. The variables kmloksh, kmregsh and kmssh representing 
distances to hospitals have been dropped from the analyses. Instead, variables representing 
time taken to travel to either a public or private hospital (reisetid_pub and reisetid_priv) will 
be used. Variables representing personnel distribution (Andel_avtaleaarsverk and 
Andel_offaarsverk) have been dropped because their effect/ role are represented by the Health 
Enterprise catchment area dummies. The variable representing additional state grants 
(Andel_tilskudd) has been dropped due to the fact that the grants and their recipients fluctuate 
every year such that they cannot be used as stable predictors of effect. Additionally, the age-
group variable Andel_16_44 has been dropped from all analyses because it is the reference 
age-group variable. However, all the other age group variables are kept in all the models 
despite the fact that they might be correlated with other variables. This is because we are 
interested in finding out the effect of the dependent variables on the different age-groups. 
Health Enterprise dummies have been kept in all models even though some show statistically 
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insignificant effect. This is because of the strong theoretical argument that the dummies 
(Fixed Effects variables) enhance the robustness of our findings (Peter 2006). As mentioned 
earlier in the methods chapter, different diagnostic approaches have been employed to test the 
viability of each variable’s inclusion in any of the models. The tolerance and VIF values for 
each variable will be provided.  
 
5.1 Total utilization of specialist health services 
The average utilization of specialist health care services in Norway is 1 070.0652, measured 
as the total number of reimbursements as a share of the population per 1 000 inhabitants. The 
explanatory power of our model is at an acceptable level of R
2
 = 0.174. 
 
5.1.1 Total specialists’ reimbursement without disaggregated 
variables 
The following variables were dropped for being highly correlated with other variables, 
Andel_rehab (Tolerance= 0.018; VIF= 57.079), Andel_ufør (Tolerance= 0.064; VIF= 15.644), 
Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.050; VIF= 20.004), and Andel_arbeidssøkere (Tolerance= 
0.012; VIF=80.265). 
The supply side variable representing number of GPs (Andel_fastleger) is insignificant with 
an estimate of 35365.858. This means that the number of GPs, has no effect on the total 
consumption of specialist outpatient services. This is in conflict with our earlier stated 
hypothesis that an increase in number of GPs leads to a decrease in the use of specialist health 
services. In addition, the result contrasts other Norwegian findings such as Iversen (2002), 
Godager (2007), Nerland (2008) and Tjerbo (2010) who find that increasing the number of 
GPs weakens their gatekeeping role and hence increases use of specialist health services. 
There are negative effects of travel time to both public and private hospitals (reisetid_pub; 
reisetid_priv). However, only the variable representing travel time to public hospitals is 
significant (p<0.01).  This is interpreted to mean that longer travelling times to a public 
hospital will lead to less utilization of specialist health services. This is in line with our 
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hypothesis and in line with findings by Nerland and Hagen (2008). Even though the 
insignificant effect of the variable representing travel time to private specialists is surprising, 
it is not entirely unexpected given the fact that public provision of specialist care is dominant 
and available in most places where private specialists may be situated. 
The variable representing gross income (Bruttoinntekt) has insignificant effect and an 
estimate 0.001 on the total utilization of specialist health services. This is in conflict with 
findings by Carlsen (2006) and our stated hypothesis which assumed that the share of the 
population with lower income would have higher utilization of specialist health care services.  
All the age-groups (Andel_0_15, Andel_45_66 and Andel_80ogover) have negative effects 
except (Andel_67_79) which has a positive estimate (25527.831). In addition, the age group 
variable (Andel_67_79) is the only one that has significant effect (p<0.05) on the dependent 
variable. This means that an increase by one of the share of population in the age group 67 to 
79 years, will lead to an increase in the total usage of specialist health services by 25527.831 
when measured against the reference age variable Andel_16_44.  Again, this is in conflict 
with our stated hypothesis that utilization of specialist health services is greatest during 
infancy and old age (0-15 and 80 years and above).   
The variable representing sickness leave (Andel-sykefravær) has a positive estimate 
(9246.008) and a significant effect on the usage of specialist health care services (p<0.05). 
This means that an increase of one in the share of the population represented by this group per 
1 000 inhabitants, will lead to an increase in the total utilization of specialist care equal to the 
estimate. The finding is in line with our stated hypothesis that there is positive correlation 
between sickness leave and utilization of specialist health care services. 
The variable representing the age group 80 years and above living alone (Andel_alenebo80) 
has an insignificant effect on the total utilization of specialist outpatient care with a positive 
estimate of 3082.363. This result contradicts our hypothesis and other findings by Nerland 
and Hagen (2008). When this variable is evaluated in relation to the other variable 
representing old age (Andel_80ogover), we see that the elderly do not have a significant effect 
on the use of specialist care. This may be explained by the availability of a wide range of 
treatment possibilities at the municipal level for people in this age group, therefore limiting 
utilization of specialist outpatient care.  
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The variable representing mortality (Andel_dødelighet) has a significant effect on the total use 
of specialist outpatient care (p<0.01) with a positive estimate (7241.262). This means that an 
increase in mortality will increase the utilization of specialist health services. This findings 
are in line with our hypothesis and findings by Hagen (2009) who found that a higher 
mortality rate increases the use of specialist health care services. 
The variable representing non-European immigrants (Andel_ikkevinnv) is highly significant 
(p<0.01) with a negative estimate of (2302.613). This means that for every increase of non-
Europeans by one, there will be a decrease in the utilization of specialist health care services 
of 2302.613. This result is somewhat surprising and contrasts our hypothesis and other 
Norwegian findings such as by Perez (2010) and Seim (2010). However, Peter C. Smith 
(2006) and Ingerbretsen & Nergård (2007) have documented that minority groups such as 
immigrants usually under-consume health care services. This would then mean that the 
negative estimate represents “unmet needs” in society and not real utilization considerations. 
The variable representing low education (Andel_kungrskole) is highly significant (p<0.01) 
with a positive estimate of 362.925. This is interpreted to mean that increase of the share of 
population by one, per 1 000 inhabitants will lead to an increase of 362.925 in the total usage 
of specialist health care services. This is in line with our hypothesis and findings by Carlsen 
(2006) that the larger the share of population with low education, the higher the utilization of 
specialist health services. 
The variable representing psychological disability (Andel_psykuføre) is significant (p<0.05) 
with a positive estimate of 198.810. This means that an increase by one of the share of 
population with psychological disability, per 1 000 inhabitants will lead to an increase in the 
total utilization of specialist health care services by 198.810. This finding is in line with our 
hypothesis. 
The variables representing share of the population receiving social benefit (Andel-
sosialhjelp), the share receiving sickness benefits (Andel_sykepenger), the share of the 
population that is divorced (Andel_skilsmisser) and the share using child welfare services 
(Andel_barnevernstiltak) all have insignificant effect on the utilization of specialist health 
services and also have negative estimates (-10.175, -12.395, -3005.804 and -849.419).  
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The variable representing single parents (Andel_ensligeforsørgere) has an insignificant effect 
on the utilization of specialist outpatient care (estimate= 1141.872). This result contradicts our 
hypothesis. 
The significance of the variables representing the 22 fixed effects health enterprise dummies 
are interpreted in relation to the reference dummy variable representing Akershus health 
enterprise. The following variable representing NordnorgeHF_dummy (estimate=7.217) is 
significant at p<0.1. In addition, the variables VestfoldHF_dummy (estimate=20.096), 
StOlavsHF_dummy (estimate= -8.382), InnlandetHF_dummy (estimate= -25.412) and 
HelgelandHF_dummy (estimate=11.844) are significant at p<0.05. Only BlefjellHF_dummy 
(estimate= -31.857) is significant at p<0.01. All the other dummy variables are insignificant. 
Positive estimates mean that the health enterprises in question receive more money (in 
Norwegian Kroner) than AkershusHF as a share of the population, per 1 000 inhabitants. The 
opposite is true for dummy variables with negative estimates. Differences in the amounts 
reimbursed between health enterprises in big towns (mostly negative estimates/less money) 
and health enterprises in rural areas (positive estimates) may be explained by Norway’s grants 
system that favour’s rural areas (Sørensen 2006; Straume and Shaw 2010). 
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Table 5: Total utilization of specialized outpatient health services without disaggregation 
Model 1A: Total Utilization of specialist 
health services (without disaggregation) 
    
      (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 512.484 (625.513)* 
  
andel_fastleger 35365.858 (31363.250) .716 1.397 
reisetid_pub -1.011 (.344)*** .290 3.448 
Reisetidpriv -0.200 (.450) .229 4.363 
Bruttoinnt 0.001 (.001) .276 3.627 
Andel_0_15 -1189.323 (5992.414) .050 19.824 
Andel_45_66 -5996.086 (7839.410) .017 59.358 
Andel_67_79 25527.831 (12834.339)** .039 25.748 
Andel_80ogover -26941.070 (18363.986) .046 21.835 
andel_sykefravær 9246.008 (4218.087)** .456 2.193 
andel_alenebo80 3082.363 (2189.236) .341 2.928 
andel_skilsmisser -3005.804 (19055.579) .642 1.558 
andel_dødelighet 7241.262 (373.930)*** .552 1.811 
andel_ensligeforsørgere 1141.872 (2991.650) .425 2.354 
andel_ikkevinnv -2302.613 (269.758)*** .825 1.212 
andel_kungrskole 362.925 (103.726)*** .490 2.042 
andel_psykuføre 198.810 (97.297)** .619 1.616 
andel_sosialhjelp -10.175 (35.085) .257 3.887 
andel_barnevernstiltak -849.419 (5250.190) .810 1.234 
andel_sykepenger -12.395 (12.097) .223 4.478 
Dummy_priv 47.061 (36.905) .506 1.974 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -100.710 (61.316) .347 2.882 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 44.454 (71.943) .676 1.479 
InnlandetHF_dummy -37.206 (15.972)** .235 4.248 
RingerikeHF_dummy -30.431 (17.596)* .584 1.712 
BuskerudHF_dummy -26.534 (18.023) .833 1.201 
BlefjellHF_dummy -35.003 (11.695)*** .476 2.100 
VestfoldHF_dummy 20.135 (9.994)** .641 1.560 
TelemarkHF_dummy 1.624 (11.945) .739 1.354 
SørlandetHF_dummy 8.537 (7.526) .416 2.404 
StavangerHF_dummy -10.006 (7.603) .536 1.865 
FonnaHF_dummy 8.374 (7.224) .520 1.922 
BergenHF_dummy 5.902 (6.147) .549 1.822 
FørdeHF_dummy -4.764 (5.768) .454 2.202 
SunmøreHF_dummy -2.986 (5.832) .601 1.663 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy -2.769 (5.614) .624 1.602 
StOlavsHF_dummy -10.497 (4.788)** .509 1.964 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -0.844 (4.664) .474 2.111 
HelgelandHF_dummy 14.108 (5.265)** .516 1.938 
NordlandHF_dummy 3.029 (4.599) .510 1.962 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 7.736 (4.101)* .436 2.291 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 4.597 (5.177) .406 2.464 
*** = p<0.01            **=p<0.05   * = p<0.1                 = Beta coefficients           
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5.1.2 Total specialists’ reimbursement with disaggregated variables  
The following variables were dropped for being highly correlated, Andel_ufør_18_39 
(Tolerance= 0.007; VIF= 137.164), Andel_ufør_40_69 (Tolerance= 0.095; VIF= 10.518), and 
Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.058; VIF= 17.160). 
The new explanatory power of our model reduces slightly to R
2
 = 0.096 after the following 
age-disaggregated categories are introduced for the variables; Andel_grskole, Andel_rehab, 
Andel_Ufør, Andel_sosialhjelp and Andel_dødelighet. 
After disaggregation, two “new” variables are retained in the final regression. One of the 
“new” variables (estimate= 3066.374) represents a share of the population undergoing 
medical rehabilitation (Andel_rehab_20_66).  The other “new” variable (estimate= -8.097) 
represents the share of the population that is unemployed (Andel_arbeidssøkere). Both 
variables have an insignificant effect on the utilization of specialist health services. This 
contradicts our hypotheses that assume increases in any of the groups would lead to higher 
utilization of specialist care. 
Just as in the previous model (1A), the age group variables representing those aged between 
0-15 years (Andel_0_15) and those aged between 45-66 years (Andel_45_66) have 
insignificant effect on the total utilization of specialist outpatient care. Additionally, the 
variable describing the age-group between 67-79 years (estimate= 22786.441) keeps its 
significant effect (p<0.1) on the dependent variable. This means that an increase of one in the 
share of population represented by this group, per 1 000 inhabitants will lead to an increase in 
the use of specialist health services corresponding to 22786.441. These results imply that 
individuals between the age-groups 0-15 and 45-66 consume less specialist outpatient 
services when compared to the reference group representing the age group 16-65. 
Consequently, individuals between 67-79 consume more than the reference group. The 
variable representing individuals in the age-group 80 years and over changes from being 
insignificant to significant (p<0.1) with an estimate of -30226.804. This means that an 
increase of one in the share of the population represented by this group per 1 000 inhabitants, 
will lead to a decrease in the total utilization of specialist outpatient corresponding to the 
estimate.   
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When the variable representing the share of the population with low education is 
disaggregated further to represent two groups (20-29 years and 30-59 years), the first group 
remains highly significant just like in model 1A (p<0.01). However, the second group 
representing the share of population with low education but aged between 30-59 becomes 
insignificant. This shows that age is important in differentiating what kind of impact a need 
characteristic (such as low education) will have on the utilization of specialist care. 
All the other variables explaining need and supply do not change in terms of significance in 
both models. 
The fixed effects dummy variable representing private specialists (dummy_priv) changes from 
being insignificant (estimate= 47.061) in the first model to becoming significant (p<0.1) with 
an estimate of 71.840. Likewise the dummy variable VestfoldHF_dummy (estimate= 6.680) 
change from being significant at (p<0.05) with corresponding estimates of 20.096 to become 
insignificant. 
All the other fixed effects dummy variables do not change in terms of their significance levels 
in the two models. 
Table 6 presents total reimbursements with disaggregated variables.  As in all models,  *** = 
p<0.01, **=p<0.05, * = p<0.1 and    = Beta coefficients.          
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Model 1B: Total reimbursements 
(disaggregated variables)   (Std. Dev) Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 776.907 (257.736)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 49467.418 (30678.700) .672 1.489 
reisetid_pub -1.287 (.328)*** .286 3.494 
Reisetidpriv -0.264 (.432) .223 4.475 
Bruttoinnt 0.001 (.001) .266 3.758 
Andel_0_15 -8542.815 (6293.291) .041 24.351 
Andel_45_66 2592.397 (7588.016) .016 61.918 
Andel_67_79 22786.441 (12376.501)* .038 26.659 
Andel_80ogover -30226.804 (17960.405)* .043 23.256 
andel_rehab_20_66 -3066.374 (4392.484) .535 1.870 
andel_sykefravær 7683.931 (4438.663)* .370 2.703 
andel_alenebo80 3265.186 (2128.096) .325 3.078 
andel_skilsmisser -2541.165 (18252.541) .628 1.592 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover 108.838 (42.272)** .526 1.902 
andel_ensligeforsørgere -349.365 (3021.883) .374 2.673 
andel_arbeidsøkere -8.097 (18.449) .126 7.906 
andel_ikkevinnv -6020.984 (257.215)*** .872 1.147 
andel_grskole_20_29 8960.805 (2874.303)*** .297 3.362 
andel_grskole_30_59 -954.491 (741.710) .352 2.838 
andel_psykufore 132.316 (103.047) .565 1.771 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 2931.379 (2009.131) .454 2.201 
andel_barnevernstiltak -2147.044 (5098.872) .772 1.296 
andel_sykepenger -15.257 (18.002) .103 9.691 
Dummy_priv 71.840 (36.233)* .472 2.117 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -120.052 (58.654)** .340 2.938 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 23.413 (68.766) .664 1.506 
InnlandetHF_dummy -56.418 (15.420)*** .227 4.406 
RingerikeHF_dummy -40.281 (16.709)** .581 1.720 
BuskerudHF_dummy -7.743 (17.146) .826 1.211 
BlefjellHF_dummy -48.206 (11.258)*** .461 2.169 
VestfoldHF_dummy 6.680 (9.565) .628 1.592 
TelemarkHF_dummy -7.255 (11.420) .725 1.379 
SørlandetHF_dummy -.404 (7.335) .394 2.539 
StavangerHF_dummy -17.984 (7.401)** .508 1.969 
FonnaHF_dummy -5.726 (7.134) .479 2.088 
BergenHF_dummy -8.006 (6.045) .511 1.958 
FørdeHF_dummy -15.139 (5.724)*** .414 2.416 
SunmøreHF_dummy -9.239 (5.728) .560 1.787 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy -10.331 (5.411)* .603 1.658 
StOlavsHF_dummy -15.535 (4.661)*** .482 2.074 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -6.715 (4.622) .433 2.310 
HelgelandHF_dummy 6.084 (5.021)+ .511 1.957 
NordlandHF_dummy -7.958 (4.541)* .469 2.131 
NordNorgeHF_dummy -1.563 (4.139) .386 2.589 
FinnmarkHF_dummy -4.439 (5.107) .375 2.663 
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5.2 Utilization of Public specialist health services 
The average utilization of public specialist health services is 888.6867, measured as the 
number of reimbursements to public specialists as a share of the population per 1 000 
inhabitants. The number varies from a minimum of 26.98 to a maximum of 21976.42 
reimbursements. 
5.2.1 Public specialists’ reimbursement without disaggregating 
variables  
Table 6 presents the final regression after the following variables were dropped for being 
highly correlated; Andel_rehab (Tolerance= 0.020; VIF= 50.660), Andel_ufør (Tolerance= 
0.062; VIF= 16.197), Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.052; VIF= 19.150), and 
Andel_arbeidssøkere (Tolerance= 0.014; VIF= 74.009). The explanatory power of this model 
is at an acceptable level of R
2
 = 0.121 and an Anova F statistic estimate that is significant 
(sig. = 0.000).  
The supply side variable representing the distribution of general practitioners 
(Andel_fastleger) is insignificant with a positive estimate of 27167.922. This means that the 
number of GPs is not important in explaining the level of utilization of specialist outpatient 
care. The finding is similar to the one in the previous model on total utilization. As mentioned 
earlier in the findings for the total utilization model, this contradicts our hypothesis that the 
number of GPs is negatively correlated to consumption of specialist care due to their role as 
gate-keepers. The finding therefore challenges the action plan proposed in the coordination 
reform that argues that increasing the number of GPs will reduce the utilization of specialist 
care. In addition, the finding contradicts other findings by Iversen (2002), Godager (2007), 
Nerland (2008) and Tjerbo (2010) who found that the number of GPs has a positive 
correlation to consumption of specialist care.  
The variable representing travel time to a public hospital (reisetid_pub) is highly significant 
(p<0.01) with a negative estimate of -1.335. This is interpreted to mean that a one unit 
increase in time taken to travel to a public hospital will lead to a decrease in the usage of 
specialist health services by 1.335. This is in line with our hypothesis and findings by Nerland 
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and Hagen (2008). The variable representing travel time to private hospitals (reisetid_priv) 
also has a significant positive effect on the utilization of public specialist health services. 
These two findings are as expected and in line with our hypotheses. 
As in the previous model on total utilization, the variable representing gross income has an 
insignificant effect on the use of public specialist health services. This contradicts our 
hypothesis and findings by Carlsen (2006). 
The variables representing the age groups Andel_0_15 (estimate= -8308.555), Andel_45_66 
(estimate= -2204.197) and Andel_80ogover (estimate= -26707.619) are all insignificant. As in 
the other models, the variable representing the age group between 67 and 79 is significant 
(p<0.1) with an estimate of 2924.408. This means that an increase by one, in the share of 
population represented by this group per 1 000 inhabitants, will lead to an increase in the use 
of public specialist health services corresponding to their estimates when measured in relation 
to the reference age variable Andel_16_46.  
The variables representing sickness leave (Andel_sykefravær) and share above 80 but living 
alone (Andel_alenebo80) are both significant at p<0.05 and p<0.1. This means an increase in 
any of the groups will lead to an increase in the use of specialist outpatient care. 
The variable representing divorces (Andel_skilsmisser) is insignificant and has a negative 
estimate of -12008.591.  This is contrary to our hypothesis but corresponds to the findings 
about the overall (total) utilization of specialist services. 
The variable representing mortality (Andel_dødelighet) is highly significant (p<.001) with an 
estimate of 4682.053. This is interpreted to mean that an increase of one, in the share of 
population represented by this group per 1 000 inhabitants, will lead to an increase in the use 
of public specialist outpatient services corresponding to the estimate. This is in line with our 
hypothesis and findings by Hagen (2009). 
Just like in the previous models, the variable representing non-European immigrants (Andel-
ikkevinnv) is highly significant (p<0.01) with an estimate of -3472.478. This means that an 
increase by one, in the share of population represented by this group per 1 000 inhabitants, 
will lead to a decrease in the use of public specialist outpatient services. This contradicts our 
hypothesis but is similar to findings in the previous model about total utilization. As 
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mentioned earlier, Ingebretsen & Nergård (2007) and Peter C. Smith (2006) have documented 
that the negative estimate is due to under-consumption common amongst minority groups. 
The variable representing persons with low education (Andel_kungrskole) is highly significant 
(p<.001) with an estimate of -295.822. This is interpreted to mean that an increase by one, in 
the share of population represented by this group per 1 000 inhabitants, will lead to a decrease 
in the use of public specialist outpatient services. This contradicts our hypothesis and findings 
in the previous model (total usage) where this group had a positive correlation with utilization 
of specialist services before disaggregation. 
The variable representing persons with psychological disability (Andel-psykuføre) is 
significant (p<0.05) with an estimate of 270.406. This is in line with our hypothesis and 
findings from the previous model on total utilization. The findings mean that an increase of 
one, in the share of population represented by this group per 1 000 inhabitants, will mean an 
increase in the utilization of public specialist outpatient care by 270.406. 
The variables representing share of population that are single parents 
(Andel_ensligeforsørgere), persons receiving social benefit (Andel_sosialhjelp), child welfare 
services (Andel_barnevernstiltak) and sickness benefits (Andel_sykepenger) are all 
insignificant. This contradicts our hypothesis but the results are similar to those from the first 
model on total utilization of specialist outpatient services.  
The following dummy variables are significant; ØstfoldHF (p<0.01; estimate= -146.842), 
RingerikeHF (p<0.1; estimate= -26.389), BlefjellHF (p<0.01; estimate=-20.876), TelemarkHF 
(p<0.1; estimate= 13.141), NordlandHF (p<0.05; estimate= 6.669), HelgelandHF (p<0.01; 
estimate= 18.159), NordNorgeHF (p<0.01; estimate= 11.311) and FinnmarkHF (p<0.01; 
estimate= 12.743). Significant health enterprises with positive estimates mean that they 
receive more money than the reference dummy variable representing AkershusHF. 
Additionally, enterprises with negative estimates receive less money than the reference. 
Findings on the dummy variables are similar to those of the first model on total utilization.  
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Table 7: Public reimbursements without disaggregation 
Model 2A: Utilization of Public specialist 
services (without disaggregation) 
    
            (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 736,299 (212,352)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 27167,922 (31711,652) ,670 1,493 
reisetid_pub #1,335 (0,270)*** ,302 3,316 
reisetidpriv 0,581 (0,341)* ,242 4,130 
Bruttoinnt ,000 (,001) ,231 4,331 
Andel_0_15 #8308,555 (6636,375) ,052 19,403 
Andel_45_66 #2204,197 (8083,127) ,017 57,550 
Andel_67_79 2924,408 (14111,416)* ,036 27,959 
Andel_80ogover #26707,619 (20026,320) ,047 21,466 
andel_sykefravær 7761,888 (3430,272)** ,441 2,265 
andel_alenebo80 3472,239 (1809,615)* ,326 3,063 
andel_skilsmisser #12008,591 (17446,488) ,623 1,606 
andel_dødelighet 4682,053 (377,534)*** ,582 1,718 
andel_ensligeforsørgere 3384,950 (2489,986) ,385 2,600 
andel_ikkevinnv #3472,478 (243,946)*** ,719 1,392 
andel_kungrskole #295,822 (86,997)*** ,526 1,900 
andel_psykuføre 270,406 (114,526)** ,603 1,657 
andel_sosialhjelp #29,721 (40,633) ,261 3,836 
andel_barnevernstiltak 3061,171 (4314,604) ,822 1,216 
andel_sykepenger #8,066 (13,847) ,226 4,432 
Dummy_priv 45,401 (27,640) ,421 2,377 
ØstfoldHF_dummy #146,842 (55,759)*** ,492 2,033 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy #34,757 (47,283) ,546 1,832 
InnlandetHF_dummy #5,713 (12,770) ,286 3,493 
RingerikeHF_dummy #26,389 (14,694)* ,676 1,480 
BuskerudHF_dummy 1,507 (11,611) ,732 1,365 
BlefjellHF_dummy #20,876 (9,435)*** ,549 1,822 
VestfoldHF_dummy 7,891 (7,118) ,533 1,878 
TelemarkHF_dummy 13,141 (7,932)* ,642 1,557 
SørlandetHF_dummy #2,660 (5,566) ,415 2,412 
StavangerHF_dummy #0,455 (5,273) ,445 2,248 
FonnaHF_dummy 3,128 (5,258) ,484 2,068 
BergenHF_dummy 1,216 (4,171) ,476 2,103 
FørdeHF_dummy 2,249 (4,459) ,449 2,227 
SunmøreHF_dummy 5,835 (4,183) ,521 1,919 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 4,484 (4,089) ,580 1,724 
StOlavsHF_dummy #4,545 (3,307) ,445 2,249 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy #4,101 (3,443) ,454 2,203 
HelgelandHF_dummy 18,159 (3,826)*** ,529 1,891 
NordlandHF_dummy 6,669 (3,235)** ,459 2,179 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 11,311 (3,855)*** ,413 2,420 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 12,743 (3,855)*** ,397 2,517 
 
*** = p<0.01          ** = p<0.05               * = p<0.1     = Beta coef 
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5.2.2 Public specialists’ reimbursement with disaggregated 
variables 
The following variables (Andel_grskole, Andel_rehab, Andel_Ufør, Andel_sosialhjelp and 
Andel_dødelighet) have been disaggregated into various age groups in order to see whether 
their effect on the dependent variable is centered on age distribution. Variables dropped 
because of high correlation are, Andel_ufør_18_39 (Tolerance=0.007; VIF= 151.597), 
Andel_ufør_40_69 (Tolerance= 0.078; VIF= 12.780), Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.059; 
VIF= 16.862). The explanatory power of the model increases slightly to R
2
 = 0.123 
After disaggregation, the variable representing time taken to travel to private hospitals 
(resitid_priv) increases its significance from p<0.1 to p<0.05. The interpretation is the same 
as before that an increase in the time taken to travel to a private hospital will lead to an 
increase in the consumption of public specialist outpatient services. This is in line with our 
hypothesis and general findings about travel time by Nerland and Hagen (2008). 
The following variables change from being insignificant in the previous model, to being 
significant after disaggregation of some variables into age categories; Personal income 
(p<0.1; estimate= 0.001), share of population in age group 0-15 (p<0.1; estimate= 10982.087) 
and share receiving social benefit (p<0.01; estimate= 4645.021). This is a surprising finding 
which implies that a part of the explanation is centered on age distribution. 
The variables representing share of the population aged between 67-79 and the share 
represented by mortality every year, change from being significant in the previous model to 
insignificant in this model.  
The Health Enterprise dummy representing (NordTrøndelagHF) regions changes from being 
insignificant to significant (p<0.1) with an estimate of 6.448.  Likewise, (StOlavHF) changes 
from being insignificant to significant (p<0.05; estimate= 3.074). 
All the other variables remain the same after disaggregation. 
Table 8 shows public utilization after disaggregation.   
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Model  2B: Utilization of Public specialist 
services (disaggregated variables) 
  Collinearity Statistics 
      (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
  
(Constant) 524.896 (199.784)***     
andel_fastleger 32098.633 (29399.741) ,631 1,584 
reisetid_pub -1.476 (.245)*** ,297 3,365 
reisetidpriv 0.764 (.311)** ,237 4,224 
Bruttoinnt 0.001 (.000)* ,217 4,614 
Andel_0_15 -10982.087 (6648.501)* ,041 24,111 
Andel_45_66 -2766.962 (7496.934) ,016 61,009 
Andel_67_79 20795.099 (12928.175) ,035 28,875 
Andel_80ogover -12662.467 (18609.487) ,044 22,869 
andel_rehab_20_66 -1747.580 (3658.129) ,488 2,050 
andel_sykefravær 4540.120 (3432.323) ,356 2,808 
andel_alenebo80 3783.966 (1666.263)** ,311 3,212 
andel_skilsmisser -8851.717 (15949.314) ,603 1,658 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover 61.642 (72.567) ,632 1,582 
andel_ensligeforsørgere 759.184 (2406.729) ,333 3,004 
andel_arbeidsøkere -14.231 (20.603) ,126 7,948 
andel_ikkevinnv -5478.857 (205.758)*** ,776 1,289 
andel_grskole_20_29 6832.419 (2307.179)*** ,276 3,627 
andel_grskole_30_59 -854.108 (594.523) ,330 3,028 
andel_psykufore 211.118 (115.352)* ,556 1,797 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 4645.021 (1524.194)*** ,448 2,234 
andel_barnevernstiltak -88.582 (3975.420) ,783 1,278 
andel_sykepenger -1.497 (19.883) ,102 9,773 
Dummy_priv 63.959 (25.779)** ,390 2,561 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -149.350 (50.811)*** ,479 2,089 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy -47.380 (42.710) ,534 1,872 
InnlandetHF_dummy -18.150 (11.761) ,275 3,640 
RingerikeHF_dummy -27.989 (13.255)** ,674 1,484 
BuskerudHF_dummy 15.545 (10.474) ,723 1,384 
BlefjellHF_dummy -28.797 (8.660)*** ,529 1,890 
VestfoldHF_dummy -.628 (6.518) ,513 1,948 
TelemarkHF_dummy 6.956 (7.242) ,625 1,600 
SørlandetHF_dummy -2.653 (5.252) ,376 2,661 
StavangerHF_dummy -6.436 (4.966) ,399 2,505 
FonnaHF_dummy -4.183 (4.966) ,435 2,297 
BergenHF_dummy -5.901 (3.935) ,429 2,330 
FørdeHF_dummy -3.098 (4.235) ,401 2,494 
SunmøreHF_dummy 2.571 (3.930) ,474 2,109 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy -.171 (3.766) ,553 1,809 
StOlavsHF_dummy -7.081 (3.074)** ,415 2,409 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -6.448 (3.281)* ,402 2,490 
HelgelandHF_dummy 10.089 (3.518)*** ,512 1,952 
NordlandHF_dummy -2.855 (3.082) ,410 2,440 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 3.884 (2.888) ,356 2,810 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 4.123 (3.645) ,363 2,758 
 
*** = p<0.01     ** = p<0.05        * = p<0.1         = Beta coefficients    
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5.3 Utilization of private specialist health services 
The average utilization of private specialist care is 175.8203, measured as the number of 
reimbursements to private specialists as a share of the population per 1 000 inhabitants.  
Dependent on the level of usage by municipalities, utilization varies from 0 to 2057.22.  
5.3.1 Private reimbursement without disaggregating variables  
The following variables were dropped for having VIF values above 10 and Tolerance values 
below 0.1, meaning that they are highly correlated with other variables. These are, 
Andel_arbeidssøker (Tolerance= 0.014; VIF= 73.809), Andel_rehab (Tolerance= 0.020; VIF= 
50.803), Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.052; VIF= 19.148), and Andel_ufør (Tolerance= 
0.062; VIF=16.136).  
The explanatory power of our model is very strong (R
2
 = 0.584) which means that our model 
explains 58.4% of the variation in the utilization of private specialist outpatient health care 
services. The ANOVA estimate (sig. = 0.000) assesses the statistical significance of the 
results against the hypothesis that the multiple R in the population is equal to zero. The above 
model reaches the stated significance because our estimated sig. = 0.000 which means that our 
p<.0005. 
The variable representing general practitioners (Andel_fastleger) is  significant (p<0.05) with 
a positive estimate of 14328.352. This means that an increase of one in the share of 
population represented by this group per 1 000 inhabitants, will lead to an increase in the use 
of private outpatient services corresponding to the estimate. This result contradicts our 
hypothesis and the results from the previous models on total and public utilization. However, 
the results are in line with findings by Iversen (2002), Godager (2007), Nerland (2008) and 
Tjerbo (2010).  
As expected, the variable representing time taken to travel to a private hospital (reisetid_priv) 
is significant (p<0.01) with an estimate of -0.337. This means that an increase by one unit of 
the time used travelling to the nearest private outpatient specialist, will lead to a decrease in 
the utilization of private specialists.  
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The variable representing travel time to a public specialist (reisetid_pub) has an insignificant 
effect on the use of private specialist outpatient services. In addition to contradicting our 
hypothesis, this finding is similar to the one in the previous model (public utilization) where 
travel time to a private specialist had an insignificant effect on the use of public specialists. 
The variable representing gross income (Brutto inntekt) is highly significant (p<0.01) with an 
estimate of 0.001. This is interpreted to mean that an increase in income will generally lead to 
an increase in the use of private specialists. This finding contradicts our hypothesis and 
findings by Carlsen (2006). Additionally, the result is different from the first two models 
where the effect of income was insignificant before disaggregation. 
The variables representing the age groups 45 -66 (Andel_45_66) and 67-79 (Andel_67_79) are 
both highly significant (p<0.01 and p<0.05) with estimates of -5723.983 and 6367.196. This 
means that, in comparison to the reference age group (Andel_16_44), an increase in the 
population represented by the age group 45-66 per 1 000 inhabitants, will lead to a decrease in 
the use of private outpatient services while an increase in the age group 67-79 will lead to an 
increase in utilization. The findings contrast our hypothesis that infants and the aged would 
generally consume more specialist health services when compared to the reference group. 
The following variables have an insignificant effect on the use of private specialists; 
Andel_0_15 (estimate=1763.388), Andel_80ogover (estimate= 3993.561), Andel_sykefravær 
(estimate= -349.111), Andel_alenebo80 (estimate= 428.922) and Andel_sosialhjelp 
(estimate= -6.148).  
The following variables are all significant at p<0.01; Andel_dødelighet (estimate= 4524.203), 
Andel_ensligeforsørger (estimate= 1961.017), Andel_kungrskole (estimate= 54.024), 
Andel_ikkvinnv (estimate= -1054.732) and Andel_barnevernstiltak (estimate= -3219.22). 
Interpretations are the same as those made in model 1 and 2. The variable representing 
psychological disability (Andel_psykufør), Andel_skilsmisser (estimate= 1552.516) and 
Andel_sykepenger (estimate= ) are significant at p<0.05. 
All the dummy variables are significant. Further, only ØstfoldHF and AskerBærumOsloHF 
have positive estimates which means that they receive more reimbursements on average for 
private specialists when compared to the reference health enterprise (AkershusHF). 
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Table 9: Private utilization of specialist health services without disaggregation 
Model 3: Private Utilization of 
Specialist Health Services (without 
disaggregation) 
    
     (Std. Error)  Tolerance VIF 
  (Constant) 36.761 (46.594)     
andel_fastleger 14328.352 (7061.143)** ,670 1,492 
reisetid_pub -0.036 (.060) ,307 3,262 
reisetidpriv -.337 (0.067)*** ,318 3,148 
Bruttoinnt 0.001 (0.000)*** ,243 4,114 
Andel_0_15 1763.388 (1472.643) ,052 19,259 
Andel_45_66 -5723.983 (1790.319)*** ,018 56,907 
Andel_67_79 6367.196 (3088.238)** ,037 26,991 
Andel_80ogover 3993.561 (4460.970) ,047 21,469 
andel_sykefravær -349.111 (762.993) ,443 2,259 
andel_alenebo80 428.922 (398.281) ,334 2,991 
andel_skilsmisser 9551.942 (3886.212)** ,623 1,606 
andel_dødelighet 4524.203 (83.824)*** ,586 1,707 
andel_ensligeforsørgere 1961.017 (533.262)*** ,416 2,402 
andel_ikkevinnv -1054.732 (53.894)*** ,731 1,369 
andel_kungrskole 54.024 (19.326)*** ,529 1,890 
andel_psykufør 53.154 (24.568)** ,603 1,657 
andel_sosialhjelp 6.148 (9.051) ,261 3,837 
andel_barnevernstiltak -3219.22 (960.573)*** ,825 1,212 
andel_sykepenger -6.683 (3.084)** ,226 4,432 
ØstfoldHF_dummy 27.889 (12.384)** ,495 2,021 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 33.183 (7.903)*** ,547 1,828 
InnlandetHF_dummy -34.527 (2.844)*** ,286 3,492 
RingerikeHF_dummy -17.574 (3.271)*** ,676 1,478 
BuskerudHF_dummy -9.601 (2.567)*** ,744 1,345 
BlefjellHF_dummy -20.696 (2.101)*** ,549 1,820 
VestfoldHF_dummy -3.328 (1.584)** ,534 1,874 
TelemarkHF_dummy -16.245 (1.762)*** ,646 1,549 
SørlandetHF_dummy -3.316 (1.226)*** ,424 2,360 
StavangerHF_dummy -11.895 (1.172)*** ,447 2,238 
FonnaHF_dummy -6.043 (1.171)*** ,484 2,067 
BergenHF_dummy -2.748 (.924)*** ,480 2,082 
FørdeHF_dummy -11.083 (.989)*** ,453 2,208 
SunmøreHF_dummy -10.453 (.930)*** ,523 1,913 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy -11.323 (.911)*** ,580 1,724 
StOlavsHF_dummy -8.938 (.734)*** ,448 2,232 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -1.762 (.764)** ,457 2,187 
HelgelandHF_dummy -8.455 (.849)*** ,533 1,876 
NordlandHF_dummy -5.663 (.718)*** ,462 2,165 
NordNorgeHF_dummy -7.714 (.658)*** ,418 2,392 
FinnmarkHF_dummy -8.223 (.846)*** ,413 2,423 
 
*** = p<0.01     ** = p< 0.05    * = p<0.1     = Beta coefficients 
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5.3.2 Private reimbursement with disaggregated variables 
The variables (Andel_grskole, Andel_rehab, Andel_Ufør, Andel_sosialhjelp and 
Andel_dødelighet) have been disaggregated into various age groups in order to see whether 
their effect on the dependent variable is centered on age distribution. 
The R
2 
of the above model = 0.605 which means that our model explains 60.5% of the 
variation in the utilization of specialist health services while the Anova output has an estimate 
(sig. = 0.000). The following variables were dropped for being highly correlated, 
Andel_ufør_18_39 (Tolerance= 0.007; VIF= 151.390), Andel_ufør_40_69 (Tolerance=0.078; 
VIF= 12.768), Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.059; VIF= 16.861).    
The variable representing those aged 80 years and above (Andel_80ogover) now changes to 
become significant (p<0.01) with an estimate of 4156.063 after age disaggregation on some 
need variables is introduced. Likewise, the variable representing those receiving social benefit 
(Andel_sosialhjelp-18_49) becomes significant (p<0.01; estimate= 1248.316) after it is 
disaggregated to cover only those between the ages of 18 to 49. 
The variable representing travel distance to a public specialist changes to become significant 
(p<0.1) with an estimate of -0.137. This is a surprising finding that contradicts the previous 
findings.  
The dummy variables representing ØstfoldHF and BuskerudHF both change to become 
insignificant. All the other need, supply and dummy variables retain the same level of 
significance and estimates as in model 3A. 
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Table 10: Private utilization with disaggregated variables 
Model 3B: Private Utilization of 
Specialist Health Services 
(disaggregated variables)    (Std. Error) 
  
Tolerance VIF 
  (Constant) 117.781 (57.593)** 
  
andel_fastleger 18399.401 (8524.369)** .632 1.582 
reisetid_pub -.137 (.071)* .303 3.304 
reisetidpriv -.172 (.081)** .297 3.367 
Bruttoinnt 0.001 (0.000)*** .225 4.437 
Andel_0_15 -1957.938 (1919.398) .042 23.875 
Andel_45_66 -3850.644 (2164.315)** .017 60.412 
Andel_67_79 8345.201 (376.842) .036 27.749 
Andel_80ogover 4156.063 (5398.904)** .044 22.869 
andel_rehab_20_66 -50.110 (1060.905) .488 2.048 
andel_sykefravær -1132.083 (994.719) .357 2.802 
andel_alenebo80 1145.074 (479.752)** .316 3.163 
andel_skilsmisser 11415.918 (4627.241)** .603 1.658 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover 45.489 (21.011)** .635 1.575 
andel_ensligeforsøgere 2068.005 (683.586)*** .347 2.878 
andel_arbeidssøkere 4.464 (5.977) .126 7.948 
andel_ikkevinnv -2306.150 (59.386)*** .784 1.276 
andel_grskole_20_29 2077.868 (666.810)*** .278 3.599 
andel_grskole_30_59 -535.961 (168.046)*** .348 2.874 
andel_psykuføre 32.229 (33.463) .557 1.797 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 1248.316 (439.147)*** .455 2.199 
andel_barnevernstiltakk -3265.577 (1151.513)*** .787 1.271 
andel_sykepenger -13.890 (5.769)** .102 9.773 
ØstfoldHF_dummy 17.950 (14.714) .480 2.081 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 23.834 (12.354)** .537 1.861 
InnlandetHF_dummy -43.782 (3.410)*** .275 3.635 
RingerikeHF_dummy -25.023 (3.840)*** .676 1.480 
BuskerudHF_dummy -1.241 (3.010) .737 1.358 
BlefjellHF_dummy -26.439 (2.512)*** .529 1.889 
VestfoldHF_dummy -9.296 (1.882)*** .518 1.930 
TelemarkHF_dummy -18.978 (2.100)*** .626 1.598 
SørlandetHF_dummy -7.086 (1.521)*** .377 2.652 
StavangerHF_dummy -15.113 (1.441)*** .399 2.504 
FonnaHF_dummy -11.768 1.439)*** .437 2.291 
BergenHF_dummy -7.482 (1.142)*** .429 2.330 
FørdeHF_dummy -14.972 (1.229)*** .401 2.494 
SunmøreHF_dummy -13.000 (1.140)*** .474 2.109 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy -14.326 (1.091)*** .554 1.805 
StOlavsHF_dummy -10.944 (0.892)*** .415 2.408 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -5.104 (0.954)*** .402 2.490 
HelgelandHF_dummy -11.355 (1.020)*** .513 1.949 
NordlandHF_dummy -9.395 (0.894)*** .410 2.440 
NordNorgeHF_dummy -10.807 (0.838)*** .356 2.810 
FinnmarkHF_dummy -10.877 (1.053)*** .368 2.717 
*** = p<0.01     ** = p< 0.05    * = p<0.1      = Beta coefficients 
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5.4 Substitution between public and private entities in the 
utilization of specialist health services 
The previous three models have tested the factors explaining the variation in the total 
consumption of outpatient specialist care, and individual consumption at both the public and 
private levels. This new model will test whether there is a possibility for substitution between 
public and private outpatient specialist health services.   
The following variables have been excluded because of high correlation with other variables, 
Andel_arbeidsøkere (Tolerance= 0.016; VIF= 62.244), Andel_rehab (Tolerance= 0.025; VIF= 
40.580), Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.055; VIF= 18.140) and Andel_ufør (Tolerance= 
0.064; VIF= 15.561). The explanatory strength of this model is extremely high (R
2
 = 0.999) 
which is expected given that the dependent variables public and private reimbursements are 
compared against each other. 
 The following variables are significant at p<0.001; Andel_fastleger (estimate= 0.650), 
reisetid_pub (estimate=0.000), Andel_45_66 (estimate= -0.016), Andel_67_79 (estimate= -
0.016) and Andel_sykefravær (estimate= 5.838), Andel_skilsmisser (estimate= -15.531) and 
Andel_alenebo80 (estimate= -2.118). Additionally, the variable Andel_ensligeforsørgere  
(estimate= -1.303) is significant at p<0.05 while Andel_80ogover  (estimate= -7.781) is 
significant at p<0.1. The interpretation for the above variables is that there is significant 
difference in the groups represented by the variables above and the choice of whether one 
uses public or private specialists. This means that no substitution is taking place between 
public and private specialists in relation to the above variables. Further, positive estimates 
mean that the share of the population in the group utilizes more public specialists when 
compared to private ones. This means that an increase by one of the variables representing 
share of population of general practitioners, travelling time to public hospitals, those on sick 
leave, and those aged between 45 and 66 years, will favor the increased utilization of public 
specialists. In the same line, an increase by one of individuals represented by significant 
variables with negative estimates will increase utilization of private specialists. 
The following variables are insignificant reisetid_priv, Brutto inntekt, Andel_0_15, 
Andel_dødelighet, Andel_ikkevinnv, Andel_kungrskole, Andel_psykuføre, Andel_sosialhjelp, 
Andel_barnevernstiltak  and  Andel_sykepenger.  Variables with an insignificant effect depict 
a situation where some form of substitution is taking place i.e. there is no significant 
difference between the share of the population represented by these variables and the type of 
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outpatient specialist service they choose to consume (public or private).   Positive estimates 
show substitution that favours public specialists while negative estimate portrays a situation 
where substitution favours private specialists. 
All the dummy variables are significant except AskerBærumOsloHF. This means that there is 
no substitution between the reference health enterprise (AkershusHF) and all the health 
enterprises that are significant. This finding is logical in the sense that the catchment areas 
represented by AskerBærumOsloHF and AkershusHF are next to each other therefore 
increasing chances of substitution. 
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Table 11: Public-Private mix without disaggregation 
  Model 4A: Public-Private mix (without 
disaggregation)   (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
  (Constant) 9.975 (0.063)***     
andel_fastleger 44.213 (6.818)*** .717 1.394 
reisetid_pub 0.000 (0.000)*** .294 3.402 
Reisetidpriv 0.000 (0.000) .238 4.195 
Bruttoinnt 0.000 (0.000)  .311 3.212 
Andel_0_15 -.306 (1.294) .053 18.834 
Andel_45_66 7.050 (1.701)*** .017 57.348 
Andel_67_79 -15.807 (2.875)*** .038 26.486 
Andel_80ogover -7.781 (4.060)* .047 21.395 
andel_sykefravær 5.838 (.971)*** .489 2.046 
andel_alenebo80 -2.118 (0.514)*** .348 2.872 
andel_skilsmisser -15.531 (4.214)*** .681 1.469 
andel_dødelighet -.076 (0.088) .552 1.811 
andel_ensligeforsørgere -1.303 (0.655)** .441 2.267 
andel_ikkevinnv .005 (0.074) .815 1.227 
andel_kungrskole 0.032 (0.024) .486 2.059 
andel_psykuføre -.014 (0.028) .618 1.618 
andel_sosialhjelp -.002 (0.010) .284 3.520 
andel_barnevernstiltak 0.030 (1.194) .820 1.220 
andel_sykepenger -.001 (0.003) .239 4.180 
Dummy_priv 0.013 (0.009) .529 1.890 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -0.042 (0.020)** .491 2.035 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 0.017 (0.023) .777 1.287 
InnlandetHF_dummy -0.015 (0.004)*** .235 4.250 
RingerikeHF_dummy 1.719 (0.005)*** .579 1.729 
BuskerudHF_dummy 1.444 (0.005)*** .787 1.271 
BlefjellHF_dummy 1.228 (0.003)*** .432 2.316 
VestfoldHF_dummy 1.082 (0.003)*** .552 1.812 
TelemarkHF_dummy 0.959 (0.003)*** .665 1.503 
SørlandetHF_dummy 0.862 (0.002)*** .331 3.023 
StavangerHF_dummy 0.424 (0.002)*** .433 2.310 
FonnaHF_dummy 0.387 (0.002)*** .414 2.415 
BergenHF_dummy 0.355 (0.001)*** .418 2.392 
FørdeHF_dummy 0.329 (0.001)*** .334 2.996 
SunmøreHF_dummy 0.859 (0.001)*** .456 2.192 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 0.805 (0.001)*** .471 2.123 
StOlavsHF_dummy 0.757 (0.001)*** .354 2.822 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy 0.725 (0.001)*** .325 3.081 
HelgelandHF_dummy 0.915 (0.001)*** .378 2.648 
NordlandHF_dummy 0.870 (0.001)*** .356 2.806 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 0.828 (0.001)*** .289 3.461 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 0.791 (0.001)*** .291 3.438 
  *** = p<0.01     ** = p< 0.05    * = p<0.1      = Beta coefficients 
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In this section, the following variables; Andel_grskole, Andel_rehab, Andel_Ufør, 
Andel_sosialhjelp and Andel_dødelighet have been disaggregated into various age-groups in 
order to test whether their effect on the dependent variable is centered on age distribution. The 
explanatory power of this model is the same as that for model 4A (R
2
 =0.999). Additionally, 
the following variables have been excluded due to high correlation with other variables, 
Andel_ufør_18_39 (Tolerance= 0.008; VIF= 132.920), Andel_attføring (Tolerance= 0.061; 
VIF= 16.474) and Andel_ufør_40_69 (Tolerance= 0.096; VIF= 10.463).  
The following variables change from insignificance in the previous model to significance 
after disaggregation. They are; Andel_0_15 (estimate= -2.821), Andel_dødelighet_20ogover 
(estimate= 0.029), Andel_grskole_20_29 (estimate= 3.770) and Andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 
(estimate= -1.184).  This is interpreted to mean that there is no form of substitution taking 
place between the public and private specialists in the treatment of the above groups.  All the 
other need and supply variables remain the same with similar estimates. 
All the dummy variables keep similar estimate values and significance levels as the previous 
model. 
 Table 12 shows public-Private mix with disaggregation. 
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Model 4B: Public-Private mix 
(disaggregated)     (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 9,941 (0,060)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 49,297 (6,574)*** ,668 1,498 
reisetid_pub 0,000 (0,000)*** ,290 3,450 
Reisetidpriv 0,000 (0,000) ,230 4,355 
Bruttoinnt 0,000 (0,000) ,301 3,319 
Andel_0_15 #2,821 (1,333)** ,043 23,074 
Andel_45_66 9,415 (1,615)*** ,017 59,753 
Andel_67_79 #15,445 (2,716)*** ,037 27,289 
Andel_80ogover #11,418 (3,900)*** ,044 22,806 
andel_rehab_20_66 #6,127 (1,033)* ,540 1,851 
andel_sykefravær 7,293 (0,997)*** ,401 2,493 
andel_alenebo80 2,658 (0,488)*** ,335 2,982 
andel_skilsmisser #12,668 (4,006)*** ,652 1,534 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover 0,029 (0,009)*** ,526 1,900 
andel_ensligeforsørgere #2,481 (0,651)*** ,386 2,591 
andel_arbeidsøkere #0,001 (0,005) ,139 7,190 
andel_ikkevinnv #0,021 (0,067) ,883 1,133 
andel_grskole_20_29 3,770 (0,635)*** ,281 3,558 
andel_grskole_30_59 0,043 (0,169) ,358 2,795 
andel_psykuføre #0,016 (0,029) ,567 1,763 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 #1,184 (0,440)*** ,449 2,225 
andel_barnevernstiltak 2,192 (1,137)* ,783 1,278 
andel_sykepenger 0,000 (0,005) ,113 8,888 
Dummy_priv 0,014 (0,009) ,506 1,976 
ØstfoldHF_dummy #0,040 (0,019)** ,486 2,057 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 0,020 (0,022) ,768 1,302 
InnlandetHF_dummy #0,012 (0,004)*** ,230 4,339 
RingerikeHF_dummy 1,717 (0,004)*** ,577 1,733 
BuskerudHF_dummy 1,444 (0,005)*** ,783 1,277 
BlefjellHF_dummy 1,228 (0,003)*** ,422 2,368 
VestfoldHF_dummy 1,082 (0,002)*** ,544 1,837 
TelemarkHF_dummy 0,959 (0,003)*** ,656 1,525 
SørlandetHF_dummy 0,863 (0,002)*** ,316 3,162 
StavangerHF_dummy 0,422 (0,002)*** ,410 2,438 
FonnaHF_dummy 0,387 (0,002)*** ,384 2,605 
BergenHF_dummy 0,353 (0,001)*** ,391 2,556 
FørdeHF_dummy 0,329 (0,001)*** ,306 3,264 
SunmøreHF_dummy 0,857 (0,001)*** ,427 2,344 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 0,804 (0,001)*** ,456 2,191 
StOlavsHF_dummy 0,758 (0,001)*** ,339 2,953 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy 0,726 (0,001)*** ,300 3,336 
HelgelandHF_dummy 0,915 (0,001)*** ,374 2,677 
NordlandHF_dummy 0,869 (0,001)*** ,327 3,055 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 0,827 (0,001)*** ,259 3,861 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 0,790 (0,001)*** ,270 3,702 
*** = p<0.01     ** = p< 0.05    * = p<0.1      = Beta coefficients 
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6 Discussion 
 
6.1 Study objectives 
The purpose of this thesis was to explain the variation in the use of specialist outpatient health 
services. In this regard, four models were constructed to investigate the factors that explain 
total consumption, Public provision, private provision and the possibility for substitution in a 
public-private mix. The study aims to fill a gap that exists in the knowledge of factors 
explaining choice of specialist services (whether public or private). Additionally, Midttun and 
Hagen (2006) have found that political leanings in Norway have had an effect on the 
composition of medical specialists. For instance, they found that increased representation of 
the conservative political wing led to an increase in the proportion of private specialists. 
Given that there is a strong possibility that a different  political coalition from the one today 
may head the next government, an analysis of the factors explaining use of either public or 
private specialist care may be used to better inform the choice of action when/if change takes 
place. 
Our models have taken into use a comprehensive amount of explanatory variables describing 
socio-economic status, health status and supply side factors that act as proxies for explaining 
the need for specialist care. The weighted Least Squares regression method has been used for 
the analysis while all variables (except income and travel time) have been standardized as a 
share of the population, per 1 000 inhabitants. Population size of each municipality has been 
used to calculate weights for use as “fixed effects” for health enterprise catchment areas. 
Additionally, all variables represent a cell that includes information on municipality, gender 
and number of inhabitants.     
 
6.2 Main findings 
The first model gives a picture of the total usage of specialist care services while the second 
and third models present the factors affecting the choice of either public or private 
consumption. Model 4 gives findings on whether there is substitution between public and 
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private provision of specialist outpatient services. The findings are divided into two groups 
(one for disaggregated variables and the other without disaggregation). 
Table 13 presents the main findings when the variables are not disaggregated. Results from 
the first three models show that the distribution of general practitioners is only important in 
explaining the utilization of private specialist care. An increase in the number of GPs 
increases the amount of private specialist services consumed. The insignificant findings on 
the effect of GPs on utilization of total and public specialists clearly contradicts findings from 
recent Norwegian studies
4
. In addition, the findings are in contrast to the policy plan of the 
coordination reform - where a 50% increase in the number of GPs is envisaged as a way of 
reducing the use of specialist care. A possible explanation for these discrepancies between our 
results and those of previous studies, may be explained by the fact that different studies have 
not disaggregated utilization to private and public utilization levels. Increased competition 
amongst the GPs might explain the positive correlation with private specialists. In addition,  
increased patient freedom in choosing and changing their GPs, reduces the GPs gate-keeping 
role due to fear of losing “customers” if they don’t give clearance for private specialist 
consultation. However, it is interesting that this is not replicated in the total and public 
consumption of specialist care.  
According to our results, income is important in explaining the use of private specialist care 
but not public or total utilization of specialist care. This is an interesting finding that 
contradicts other Norwegian findings such as that by Midttun and Hagen (2006) who found 
that income had no significant effect on the use of either public or private specialists. 
Additionally, the finding is similar to those in countries with different health care systems. 
Generally, travel time has a negative effect on the use of specialist services. An increase in the 
time taken to travel to specialist hospitals will reduce the utilization of specialist care both in 
absolute and relative terms. For instance, an increase in travel time to a public hospital 
reduces the consumption of public hospital outpatient care but not that of private specialists, 
and vice versa. However, the most interesting finding as concerns travel time is the fact that 
there is a possibility for substitution when the travel time to a private specialist increases. This 
is surprising since the substitution effect is not reciprocated when travel time to a public 
specialist increases. A possible explanation for this may be the conglomeration of  private 
specialists in big towns which are also dominated by public specialists.  
                                                 
4
 See Iversen (2002), Godager (2007), Nerland (2008), Tjerbo (2010), Seim (2010) and Palacio (2010). 
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The age group 67-79 records a positive effect across the total, public and private utilization 
models. This implies that individuals in the reference age group (16-44) utilize less specialist 
services on average, when compared to this age-group. The age-groups; 0-15 and 45-69 
record insignificant negative effects in the utilization of private and public specialists. This is 
an interesting finding as we had expected that infants (0-15) and the aged (above 67) would 
be the main consumption groups. Our results imply an even (flat) utilization of specialist 
outpatient care from birth up-to 66 years.  
The variable representing share of the population above 80 years has an insignificant effect on 
the utilization of specialist care across the three utilization models. This is an interesting 
finding given that earlier Norwegian studies
5
 have found that an increase in the share of 
population in this group leads to an increase in the utilization of public specialist services. The 
fact that this group has an insignificant effect may be explained by the presence of 
multidisciplinary treatment options targeting this group, at the municipal level. This may then 
reduce the demand for specialist outpatient care. 
Immigrants from non-western European countries have a general negative effect on the 
utilization of specialist care. This finding is contrary to our expectations. However, the 
negative effect may be explained by what Smith (2006) calls “un-met need” where minority 
groups usually under-consume health care services.  
Substitution between the public and private specialists takes place in the treatment of groups 
represented by the following variables; travel time to private specialists, personal income, 
share of the population aged 0 – 15, share mortality, share non-western immigrants, share low 
education, share psychological disability, share social welfare, share receiving child welfare 
and share receiving sickness benefits. However, the substitution effect is very weak as 
evidenced by the extremely low estimate values ranging from 0.000 to 0.032. This is an 
interesting finding that raises other questions about why the level is so low when the potential 
for substitution exists for the share of the population represented by the above groups.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 See Midttun & Hagen (2006), Seim (2010) and Palacio (2010). 
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Table 13: Significant effects without disaggregation 
Variables 
Model 1: 
Total 
consumption 
Model 2: 
public 
specialists 
Model 3: 
private 
specialists 
Model 4: 
possibility of 
substitution 
 
General practitioners no no yes (+) no 
 
Travel time to public 
specialist yes (-) yes (-) no no 
 
Travel time to private 
specialists no yes (+) yes (-) yes (+) 
 
Gross income no no yes (+) yes (+) 
 
share aged 0-15 no no no yes (-) 
 
share aged 45-66 no no yes (-) no 
 
share aged 67-79 yes (+) yes (+) yes (+) no 
 
share aged 80 & over no no no no 
 
share sickness leave                   yes (+) yes (+) no no 
 
80 year olds living alone no yes (+) no no 
 
share Divorced no no yes (+) no 
 
Mortality yes (+) yes (+) yes (+) yes (-) 
 
share Single parents no no yes (+) no 
 
share Non-western 
European immigrants yes (-) yes (-) yes (-) yes (+) 
 
share Low education yes (+) yes (+) yes (+) yes (+) 
 
share Psychological 
disability yes (+) yes (+) yes (+) yes (-) 
 
share Social benefit no no no yes (-) 
 
share Child welfare 
services no no yes (-) yes (+) 
  share Sickness benefit no no yes (-) yes (-) 
 
Table 14 presents the results after disaggregation of some variables into different age groups. 
The share of population aged 67-79 now has a significant effect only on the total utilization of 
specialist outpatient care.  
The variable representing time taken to travel to a private specialist now has a positive 
significance in the utilization of public specialists. However, this effect is not mirrored in the 
total utilization of specialist care. This implies that age may have an important effect on 
whether one chooses to travel longer distances to access the type of specialist care they want.  
After disaggregating the variable representing mortality to only cover those aged 20 and 
above, the variable now becomes insignificant in the model representing public utilization of 
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specialist care. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions on whether infancy has an effect 
on use considering that the variables remains significant in the other two utilization models.  
Some form of substitution is now possible in the share of population represented by the 
following variables; travel time to a private specialist, gross income, share unemployed, share 
non-western Immigrants, share low education aged between 30-59, share psychological 
disability and the share receiving sickness benefits. However, a similar situation as in the 
previous model persists where the estimated level of substitution is extremely low. This may 
explain the change of some variables from no substitution to substitution when age groups are 
disaggregated.  
In summary, model 4 shows that there is a definite possibility for substitution between public 
and private provision of outpatient specialist services. However, the low levels of substitution 
today present a surprising finding. 
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Table 14: Significant effects after disaggregation 
Variables 
Model 1: Total 
consumption 
Model 2: public 
specialists 
Model 3: 
private 
specialists 
Model 4: 
possibility of 
substitution 
 
General practitioners no no yes (+) no 
 
Travel time to public 
specialist yes (-) yes (-) yes (-) no 
 
Travel time to private 
specialists no yes (+) yes (-) yes (+) 
 
Gross income no yes (+) yes (+) yes (+) 
 
share aged 0-15 no yes (-) no no 
 
share aged 45-66 no no yes (-) no 
 
share aged 67-79 yes (+) no no no 
 
share aged 80 and over yes (-) no yes (+) no 
 
share rehabilitation 20-
66 no no no no 
 
share sickness leave no no no no 
 
80 year olds living alone no yes (+) yes (+) no 
 
share Divorced no no yes (+) no 
 
Mortality 20 and over yes (+) no yes (+) no 
 
share unemployed no no no yes (-) 
 
share Single parents no no yes (+) no 
 
share Non-western 
European immigrants yes (-) yes (-) yes (-) yes (-) 
 
share with Low 
education 20-29 yes (+) yes (+) yes (+) no 
 
share with low 
education 30-59 no no yes (-) yes (+) 
 
share Psychological 
disability  no yes (+) no yes (-) 
 
share Social benefit 18-
49 no yes (+) yes (+) no 
 
share Child welfare 
services no no yes (-) no 
  share Sickness benefit no no yes (-) yes (+) 
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6.3 Limitations 
The data set used in this study contains a comprehensive set of explanatory socio-economic, 
health and demographic data aggregated at the municipal level. However, data collected at the 
individual level is still the most ideal for the type of analyses carried out in this thesis as it 
provides the actual individual picture of need and utilization. In the study, we used a fixed 
effects model to correct for errors that may occur due to the aggregation of observations at the 
municipal level. However, the fixed effects model may limit the scope of inferences as 
compared to a random effects model when individual level data is in use. When available, 
data collected at the individual level data may be able to improve the model.  
Originally, we intended to include data collected for the year 2005 which would have 
increased our observational period to three years instead of two. However, due to limited 
amounts of data for most of the variables in the analysis, it was decided to drop observations 
from 2005. A dataset containing observations taken for longer periods may be able to capture 
changes and trends taking place over time.  
Data representing people in the age group 50 – 59 is missing in our data set. We have 
therefore assumed that the age groups slightly below and above the missing set can correctly 
approximate their impact in our analysis. Observations covering the missing values may 
improve the model. 
The effect of some of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables changed after 
disaggregation was undertaken in order to take into consideration some specific age-groups. 
However, the disaggregation was only done on five of the explanatory variables. Increasing 
the number of variables disaggregated may improve the model 
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7 Conclusion 
The results from this study suggest that income has a differentiated influence on the demand 
of specialist outpatient services. An increase in personal income increases the demand for 
private specialist services despite the fact that out-of-pocket charges in Norway are minimal 
due to public sponsoring of the health care services. 
Findings on the effect of general practitioners contradict findings of recently published studies 
investigating the policy implications of increasing GP coverage by 50 per cent as aspired to 
by the looming coordination reform. We find that GPs only have a positive correlation with 
the utilization of private specialist outpatient care.   
The study finds a surprisingly insignificant effect of the elderly’s consumption of specialist 
health care services in most of the models. However, the findings may be explained by the 
structural organization of the Norwegian health system that offers a multidisciplinary 
treatment set up for this group at the municipal level. 
We find that there is a definite potential for substitution between public and private outpatient 
services. However, the analysis only finds weak forms of substitution on a surprisingly high 
number of variables representing different needs. This is an interesting finding that needs 
further investigation in order to understand why the levels of substitution are at such low 
levels. A scarcity of studies on this issue both in Norway and internationally means that we 
cannot make comparisons on typical outcomes.  
Future research should also make use of longer study periods that increase the possibilities of 
capturing long-term changes and trends which cannot be discovered in shorter lengths of time. 
Additionally, information collected at the individual level should be taken into use if and 
when they become available. 
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9.2 Table showing Private Hospitals 
Private Hospitals Location 
 
Aleris Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim Kristiansand and Romerike (Akershus) 
 
Drammen Privat sykehus Drammen 
 
Feiringklinikken Akershus 
 
Glittreklinikken Nittedal, Akershus 
 
Hjertesenteret Oslo Oslo 
 
Medi 3 Molde Molde 
 
Medi 3 Ålesund Ålesund 
 
Sykehus og spesialistklinikk Oslo 
  Volvat medisinske senter Vestre Aker, Oslo 
 
  
 XI 
 
9.3 Table showing Municipalities excluded from the analysis 
  Vindafjord (t.o.m. 2005): 
  Fra 1. januar 2006 ble kommunene 1154 Vindafjord og 1159 Ølen i  
  Rogaland fylke slått sammen til en ny kommune 1160 Vindafjord. 
  Ølen (t.o.m. 2005): 
  Fra 1. januar 2006 ble kommunene 1154 Vindafjord og 1159 Ølen i  
  Rogaland fylke slått sammen til en ny kommune 1160 Vindafjord. 
  Vindafjord: 
  Fra 1. januar 2006 ble kommunene 1154 Vindafjord og 1159 Ølen i  
  Rogaland fylke slått sammen til en ny kommune 1160 Vindafjord. 
  Kristiansund  (t.o.m. 2007): 
  Fra 1. januar 2008 er kommunene 1503 Kristiansund og 1556 Frei i Møre  
  og Romsdal fylke slått sammen til ny kommune 1505 Kristiansund. 
  Kristiansund: 
  Fra 1. januar 2008 er kommunene 1503 Kristiansund og 1556 Frei i Møre  
  og Romsdal fylke slått sammen til ny kommune 1505 Kristiansund. 
  Vanylven: 
  Ved grenseregulering 1. januar 2002 ble ca. 380 personer overført fra  
  1514 Sande kommune til 1511 Vanylven kommune. 
  Sande (M. og R.): 
  Ved grenseregulering 1. januar 2002 ble ca. 380 personer overført fra  
  1514 Sande kommune til 1511 Vanylven kommune. 
  Frei (t.o.m. 2007): 
  Fra 1. januar 2008 er kommunene 1503 Kristiansund og 1556 Frei i Møre  
  og Romsdal fylke slått sammen til ny kommune 1505 Kristiansund. 
  Aure (t.o.m. 2005): 
  Fra 1. januar 2006 ble kommunene 1569 Aure og 1572 Tustna i Møre og  
  Romsdal fylke slått sammen til ny kommune 1576 Aure. 
  Tustna (t.o.m. 2005): 
  Fra 1. januar 2006 ble kommunene 1569 Aure og 1572 Tustna i Møre og  
  Romsdal fylke slått sammen til ny kommune 1576 Aure. 
  Aure: 
  Fra 1. januar 2006 ble kommunene 1569 Aure og 1572 Tustna i Møre og  
  Romsdal fylke slått sammen til ny kommune 1576 Aure. 
  Bodø: 
  Fra 1. januar 2005 er 1804 Bodø og 1842 Skjerstad i Nordland fylke  
  slått sammen til en kommune 1804 Bodø. 
  Skjerstad (t.o.m. 2004): 
  
Fra 1. januar 2005 er 1804 Bodø og 1842 Skjerstad i Nordland fylke slått sammen til en 
kommune 1804 Bodø.  
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9.4 Table showing Health Enterprises (HF) and their assigned 
numbers in the analysis 
  HE number Health Enterprise (HF) 
 
1 Sykehuset Østfold HF 
 
2 Sykehuset Asker og Bærum HF/ Oslo sykehusområde 
 
3 Akershus universitetssykehus HF 
 
4  Sykehuset Innlandet HF 
 
5  Ringerike sykehus HF 
 
6  Sykehuset Buskerud HF 
 
7  Blefjell sykehus HF 
 
8  Sykehuset i Vestfold HF 
 
9  Sykehuset Telemark HF 
 
10  Sørlandet sykehus HF 
 
11  Helse Stavanger HF 
 
12 Helse Fonna HF 
 
13  Helse Bergen HF 
 
14  Helse Førde HF 
 
15  Helse Sunnmøre HF 
 
16  Helse Nordmøre og Romsdal HF 
 
17  St Olavs Hospital HF 
 
18  Helse Nord-Trøndelag HF 
 
19  Helgelandssykehuset HF 
 
20  Nordlandssykehuset HF 
 
21  Universitetssykehuset i Nord-Norge HF (UNN) 
  22  Helse Finnmark HF 
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9.5 Tables showing results of the analyses 
9.5.1 Results of Total Utilization of specialized health care services 
Model 1A: Total Utilization of 
specialist health services (without 
disaggregation) 
    
B     (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 1486.434 (625.513)** 
  
andel_fastleger 2955.287 (775.126)*** .239 4.180 
reisetid_pub -1.098 (.329)*** .308 3.248 
reisetidpriv -0.263 (.439) .233 4.284 
Bruttoinnt 0.000 (.001) .251 3.986 
Andel_0_15 -19.506 (13.577) .154 6.503 
Andel_45_66 -10.104 (9.961) .317 3.155 
Andel_67_79 16.307 (12.526) .235 4.247 
Andel_80ogover -53.820 (14.701)*** .235 4.253 
andel_ufør 6.427 (6.789) .284 3.516 
andel_alenebo80 260.071 (49.134)*** .106 9.476 
andel_skilsmisser 1340.998 (346.727)*** .214 4.673 
andel_dødelighet -208.260 (701.685) .152 6.578 
andel_ikkevinnv -2722.350 (268.245)*** .809 1.236 
andel_kungrskole 498.642 (103.642)*** .476 2.103 
andel_psykuføre 205.435 (95.782)** .619 1.615 
andel_sosialhjelp -14.753 (34.525) .258 3.882 
andel_barnevernstiltak -50.184 (118.906) .179 5.596 
andel_sykepenger -12.600 (11.875) .225 4.450 
Dummy_priv 52.203 (35.256) .538 1.858 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -103.358 (60.137)* .350 2.859 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 89.133 (71.467) .664 1.506 
InnlandetHF_dummy -25.412 (15.445)* .244 4.096 
RingerikeHF_dummy -24.537 (17.135) .597 1.674 
BuskerudHF_dummy -18.412 (17.635) .843 1.186 
BlefjellHF_dummy -31.857 (11.076)*** .515 1.943 
VestfoldHF_dummy 20.096 (9.874)** .637 1.570 
TelemarkHF_dummy 3.568 (11.703) .746 1.340 
SørlandetHF_dummy 7.101 (7.684) .387 2.584 
StavangerHF_dummy -10.509 (7.079) .600 1.667 
FonnaHF_dummy 6.576 (6.717) .584 1.713 
BergenHF_dummy 8.837 (5.898) .578 1.730 
FørdeHF_dummy -0.227 (5.442) .495 2.021 
SunmøreHF_dummy 1.211 (5.611) .630 1.587 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 0.566 (5.404) .654 1.530 
StOlavsHF_dummy -8.382 (4.706)** .511 1.957 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy 0.761 (4.557) .481 2.079 
HelgelandHF_dummy 11.844 (4.992)** .557 1.797 
NordlandHF_dummy 1.845 (4.411) .537 1.861 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 7.217 (4.248)* .394 2.535 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 0.830 (5.007) .421 2.376 
 
 XIV 
 
  Model 1B: Total reimbursements 
(disaggregated variables)     (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 2359.100 (563.091)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 2908.718 (731.857)*** .238 4.208 
reisetid_pub -1.204 (.291)*** .311 3.213 
reisetidpriv -0.073 (.392) .233 4.301 
Bruttoinnt -0.000 (.001) .270 3.708 
Andel_0_15 -31.802 (12.345)** .148 6.771 
Andel_45_66 -17.667 (8.648)** .334 2.996 
Andel_67_79 9.729 (11.187) .234 4.269 
Andel_80ogover -60.915 (13.287)*** .228 4.376 
andel_rehab_20_66 164.213 (91.248)* .123 8.115 
andel_alenebo80 318.413 (39.863)*** .141 7.090 
andel_skilsmisser 1169.425 (373.591)*** .164 6.095 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover -0.055 (.129) .949 1.053 
andel_arbeidsøkere -14.522 (17.072) .127 7.902 
andel_ikkevinnv -4204.942 (243.971)*** .830 1.205 
andel_psykuføre 197.317 (95.291)** .566 1.768 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 -60.338 (41.170) .128 7.823 
andel_barnevernstiltak -45.829 (118.175) .161 6.217 
andel_sykepenger -3.396 (16.652) .103 9.679 
Dummy_priv 60.579 (31.432)* .538 1.860 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -71.163 (51.921) .372 2.687 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 89.371 (63.626) .664 1.505 
InnlandetHF_dummy -29.405 (813.658)** .248 4.035 
RingerikeHF_dummy -26.761 (15.257)* .597 1.674 
BuskerudHF_dummy -5.791 (15.733) .840 1.190 
BlefjellHF_dummy -35.228 (9.830)*** .518 1.930 
VestfoldHF_dummy 16.707 (8.519)* .678 1.474 
TelemarkHF_dummy 3.781 (10.353) .756 1.323 
SørlandetHF_dummy 5.696 (6.290) .459 2.179 
StavangerHF_dummy -10.549 (6.375)* .586 1.705 
FonnaHF_dummy 0.433 (5.978) .584 1.711 
BergenHF_dummy 4.500 (5.277) .574 1.741 
FørdeHF_dummy -5.368 (4.804) .503 1.987 
SunmøreHF_dummy -1.149 (4.956) .640 1.562 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy -0.816 (4.808) .655 1.528 
StOlavsHF_dummy -10.340 (4.146)** .522 1.916 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -1.003 (4.034) .487 2.054 
HelgelandHF_dummy 10.802 (4.369)** .578 1.729 
NordlandHF_dummy 1.521 (3.863) .555 1.800 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 6.847 (3.472)** .470 2.127 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 3.187 (4.432) .427 2.342 
*** = p<0.01          ** p<0.05 
  = Beta coefficients               
* = p<0.1 
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9.5.2 Results of Public Utilization of specialized health care services 
Model 2A: Utilization of Public 
specialist services (without 
disaggregation) 
    
            (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 2572.188 (379.216)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 3982.917 (946.216)*** .210 4.771 
reisetid_pub -1.335 (0.260)*** .320 3.127 
reisetidpriv 0.226 (0.294) .323 3.098 
Bruttoinnt .000 (.001) .200 4.991 
Andel_0_15 -39.769 (7.980)*** .265 3.778 
Andel_45_66 -22.506 (7.156)*** .354 2.823 
Andel_67_79 2.449 (10.330) .219 4.560 
Andel_80ogover -32.242 (12.594)** .212 4.721 
andel_ufor 14.396 (5.604)** .247 4.050 
andel_skilsmisser -29.589 (395.842) .188 5.311 
andel_dødelighet 1728.648 (617.367)*** .213 4.696 
andel_ikkevinnv -3338.556 (227.619)*** .608 1.645 
andel_kungrskole -250.444 (86.982)*** .515 1.940 
andel_psykuføre 270.942 (114.263)** .604 1.655 
andel_sosialhjelp -38.418 (40.549) .261 3.833 
andel_barnevernstiltak 162.521 (126.273) .179 5.602 
andel_sykepenger -6.185 (13.782) .227 4.406 
Dummy_priv 44.502 (26.645)* .227 2.225 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -189.996 (55.796)** .489 2.044 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy -49.557 (36.754) .393 2.545 
InnlandetHF_dummy -12.885 (12.674) .289 3.461 
RingerikeHF_dummy -31.242 (14.689)* .674 1.484 
BuskerudHF_dummy 6.094 (11.469) .757 1.321 
BlefjellHF_dummy -24.416 (9.294)*** .564 1.774 
VestfoldHF_dummy 3.151 (7.058) .538 1.858 
TelemarkHF_dummy 10.080 (7.711) .650 1.538 
SørlandetHF_dummy -4.561 (5.614) .383 2.610 
StavangerHF_dummy -4.794 (4.977) .486 2.056 
FonnaHF_dummy 0.799 (4.863) .526 1.902 
BergenHF_dummy 1.022 (4.029) .470 2.128 
FørdeHF_dummy 3.174 (4.160) .468 2.139 
SunmøreHF_dummy 6.739 (3.939)* .536 1.865 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 5.397 (3.925) .593 1.687 
StOlavsHF_dummy -5.308 (3.196)* .437 2.286 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -3.430 (3.180) .461 2.169 
HelgelandHF_dummy 16.012 (3.550)*** .557 1.795 
NordlandHF_dummy 4.860 (3.011) .495 2.021 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 9.486 (2.994)*** .394 2.539 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 11.115 (3.596)*** .454 2.200 
 
*** = p<0.01          ** =p<0.05 
  = Beta coefficients               
* = p<0.1 
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Model  2B: Utilization of Public 
specialist services (disaggregated 
variables) 
  Collinearity Statistics 
      (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
  
(Constant) 2825.155 (346.921)***     
andel_fastleger 4326.222 (896.894)*** .209 4.779 
reisetid_pub -1.394 (.233)*** .317 3.152 
reisetidpriv 0.526 (.306)** .237 4.211 
Bruttoinnt -0.001 (.000) .209 4.790 
Andel_0_15 -47.148 (7.620)*** .230 4.355 
Andel_45_66 -21.890 (6.273)*** .366 2.732 
Andel_67_79 -3.301 (9.269) .216 4.619 
Andel_80ogover -26.758 (11.436)** .204 4.900 
andel_rehab_20_66 98.636 (98.170) .124 8.041 
andel_skilsmisser -53.131 (447.096) .133 7.492 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover -0.068 (.249) .988 1.012 
andel_ikkevinnv -3868.525 (187.479)*** .618 1.619 
andel_psykuføre 267.381 (109.526)* .605 1.653 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 10.363 (42.866) .125 8.027 
andel_barnevernstiltak 193.963 (126.117) .161 6.194 
andel_sykepenger -12.091 (8.105) .603 1.657 
Dummy_priv 48.818 (24.143)** .423 2.364 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -156.600 (48.779)*** .509 1.967 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 87.628 (32.816)*** .389 2.568 
InnlandetHF_dummy -13.853 (11.264) .292 3.422 
RingerikeHF_dummy -30.348 (13.102)** .676 1.480 
BuskerudHF_dummy 9.339 (10.227) .743 1.346 
BlefjellHF_dummy -25.864 (8.267)*** .569 1.759 
VestfoldHF_dummy 5.651 (6.098) .574 1.742 
TelemarkHF_dummy 9.619 (7.003) .655 1.527 
SørlandetHF_dummy -2.163 (4.832) .435 2.301 
StavangerHF_dummy -3.593 (4.529) .470 2.128 
FonnaHF_dummy -1.394 (4.463) .528 1.895 
BergenHF_dummy -1.675 (3.743) .464 2.153 
FørdeHF_dummy -0.333 (3.846) .476 2.100 
SunmøreHF_dummy 3.600 (3.614) .549 1.821 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 3.387 (3.590) .596 1.678 
StOlavsHF_dummy -7.081 (2.940)** .444 2.252 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -3.938 (3.041) .460 2.173 
HelgelandHF_dummy 13.121 (3.313)*** .566 1.767 
NordlandHF_dummy 2.106 (2.770) .497 2.012 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 8.062 (2.553)*** .445 2.249 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 8.225 (3.307)** .431 2.318 
 
*** = p<0.01              ** = p<0.05                      * = p<0.1 
  
 
  = Beta coefficients 
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9.5.3 Results of Private Utilization of specialized health care 
services 
Model 3: Private Utilization 
of Specialist Health Services 
(without disaggregation) 
    
      (Std. Error)  Tolerance VIF 
  (Constant) 369.734 (81.536)***     
andel_fastleger 654.181 (203.463)*** 0.21 4.771 
reisetid_pub -0.056 (.056) 0.32 3.128 
Reisetidpriv -0.330 (0.063)*** 0.323 3.097 
Bruttoinnt 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.2 4.991 
Andel_0_15 -5.875 (1.716)*** 0.265 3.779 
Andel_45_66 -7.622 (1.539)*** 0.354 2.823 
Andel_67_79 2.385 (2.221) 0.219 4.560 
Andel_80ogover -1.620 (2.708) 0.212 4.719 
andel_ufør 0.017 (1.205) 0.247 4.051 
andel_skilsmisser 1552.516 (85.119)*** 0.188 5.312 
andel_dodelighet 2800.781 (132.754)*** 0.213 4.697 
andel_ikkevinnv -1119.818 (48.948)*** 0.608 1.645 
andel_kungrskole 98.934 (18.707)*** 0.515 1.941 
andel_psykufør 53.154 (24.568)** 0.604 1.655 
andel_sosialhjelp 3.909 (8.719) 0.261 3.833 
andel_barnevernstiltak -177.337 (27.155)*** 0.178 5.604 
andel_sykepenger -6.900 (2.963) 0.227 4.406 
ØstfoldHF_dummy 32.245 (11.998)*** 0.489 2.044 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 33.183 (7.903)*** 0.393 2.546 
InnlandetHF_dummy -32.186 (2.725)*** 0.289 3.461 
RingerikeHF_dummy -16.552 (3.159)*** 0.674 1.484 
BuskerudHF_dummy -9.671 (2.452)*** 0.757 1.321 
BlefjellHF_dummy -19.801 (1.998)*** 0.564 1.774 
VestfoldHF_dummy -2.536 (1.519)** 0.538 1.858 
TelemarkHF_dummy -15.147 (1.692)*** 0.65 1.538 
SørlandetHF_dummy -3.287 (1.242)*** 0.383 2.611 
StavangerHF_dummy -12.770 (1.082)*** 0.486 2.056 
FonnaHF_dummy -5.328 (1.082)*** 0.526 1.902 
BergenHF_dummy -2.329 (0.900)** 0.47 2.128 
FørdeHF_dummy -10.158 (0.938)*** 0.467 2.139 
SunmøreHF_dummy -10.192 (0.885)*** 0.536 1.865 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy -10.238 (0.868)*** 0.593 1.687 
StOlavsHF_dummy -8.487 (0.715)*** 0.437 2.286 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy -1.117 (0.733) 0.461 2.169 
HelgelandHF_dummy -7.679 (0.800)*** 0.557 1.795 
NordlandHF_dummy -4.775 (0.669)*** 0.495 2.021 
NordNorgeHF_dummy -7.243 (0.653)*** 0.394 2.539 
FinnmarkHF_dummy -8.208 (0.775)*** 0.456 2.191 
 
*** = p<0.01      ** = p< 0.05     * = p<0.1 
  
 
  = Beta coefficients 
   
 XVIII 
 
Model 3B: Private Utilization of 
Specialist Health Services 
(disaggregated variables) 
B  (Std. Error) 
  
Tolerance VIF 
  (Constant) 757,570 (92,936)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 350,039 (206,204)** ,189 5,281 
reisetid_pub #0,052 (0,050) ,324 3,085 
Reisetidpriv #0,258 (0,057)*** ,326 3,069 
Bruttoinnt 0,000 (0,000)*** ,226 4,426 
Andel_0_15 #11,655 (1,905)*** ,178 5,607 
Andel_45_66 #10,699 (1,453)*** ,347 2,881 
Andel_67_79 #0,861 (2,104) ,205 4,885 
Andel_80ogover #22,649 (2,658)*** ,178 5,632 
andel_rehab_20_66 69,663 (21,914)*** ,119 8,378 
andel_alenebo80 207,880 (9,922)*** ,120 8,325 
andel_skilsmisser 1363,145 (97,076)*** ,137 7,274 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover #0,007 (0,054) ,987 1,013 
andel_arbeidssøkere #2,974 (4,410) ,126 7,947 
andel_ikkevinnv #1343,812 (45,717)*** ,720 1,389 
andel_psykufore 50,978 (24,667)** ,558 1,794 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 #40,378 9,620)*** ,121 8,293 
andel_barnevernstiltakk #185,581 (27,759)*** ,159 6,276 
andel_sykepenger #5,324 (4,255) ,102 9,770 
ØstfoldHF_dummy 16,571 (10,630) ,501 1,996 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 54,580 (9,351)*** ,511 1,958 
InnlandetHF_dummy #35,891 (2,468)*** ,286 3,499 
RingerikeHF_dummy #21,504 (2,843)*** ,671 1,490 
BuskerudHF_dummy #5,771 (2,199)*** ,751 1,331 
BlefjellHF_dummy #22,105 (1,809)*** ,556 1,800 
VestfoldHF_dummy #5,516 (1,322)*** ,571 1,750 
TelemarkHF_dummy #15,873 (1,522)*** ,648 1,542 
SørlandetHF_dummy #4,762 (1,052)*** ,429 2,331 
StavangerHF_dummy #13,355 (0,983)*** ,467 2,140 
FonnaHF_dummy #8,295 (0,969)*** ,523 1,911 
BergenHF_dummy #4,101 (0,814)*** ,460 2,175 
FørdeHF_dummy #11,642 (0,833)*** ,475 2,105 
SunmøreHF_dummy #11,003 (0,784)*** ,546 1,833 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy #10,941 (0,778)*** ,593 1,686 
StOlavsHF_dummy #9,316 (0,643)*** ,434 2,302 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy #2,484 (0,658)*** ,459 2,177 
HelgelandHF_dummy #8,379 (0,718)*** ,563 1,776 
NordlandHF_dummy #5,725 (0,601)*** ,494 2,025 
NordNorgeHF_dummy #8,189 (0,555)*** ,441 2,268 
FinnmarkHF_dummy #7,939 (0,715)*** ,435 2,299 
*** = p<0.01      ** = p< 0.05    * = p<0.1 
   = Beta  coefficients 
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9.5.4 Results of Public-Private mix Utilization of specialized health 
care services 
Model 4B: Public-Private mix 
(disaggregated) B   (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 9.719 (0.144)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 0.574 (0.169)*** .265 3.776 
reisetid_pub 0.000 (0.000)*** .312 3.204 
reisetidpriv -0.000 (0.000) .241 4.149 
Bruttoinnt -2.457 (0.000) .296 3.382 
Andel_0_15 0.003 (0.003) .152 6.576 
Andel_45_66 0.016 (0.002)*** .319 3.135 
Andel_67_79 -0.013 (0.003)*** .248 4.036 
Andel_80ogover 0.009 (0.003)*** .252 3.967 
andel_rehab_20_66 -0.040 (0.024)* .122 8.171 
andel_uføre_18_39 -0.054 (0.116) .103 9.687 
andel_alenebo80 0.002 (0.010) .135 7.399 
andel_skilsmisser -0.124 (0.099) .171 5.832 
andel_dødelighet_20ogover 0.000 (0.000) .947 1.056 
andel_arbeidsøkere -0.000 (0.005) .139 7.187 
andel_ikkevinnv -0.020 (0.069) .835 1.197 
andel_psykuføre -0.006 (0.029) .568 1.760 
andel_sosialhjelp_18_49 -0.000 (0.010) .139 7.211 
andel_barnevernstiltak 0.031 (0.030) .167 5.993 
andel_sykepenger -0.002 (0.005) .113 8.868 
Dummy_priv 0.018 (0.008)** .540 1.852 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -0.026 (0.019) .494 2.024 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 0.010 (0.022) .768 1.302 
InnlandetHF_dummy -0.008 (0.004)* .237 4.214 
RingerikeHF_dummy 1.723 (0.005)*** .584 1.711 
BuskerudHF_dummy 1.445 (0.005)*** .787 1.270 
BlefjellHF_dummy 1.232 (0.003)*** .439 2.277 
VestfoldHF_dummy 1.082 (0.002)*** .544 1.840 
TelemarkHF_dummy 0.960 (0.003)*** .652 1.534 
SørlandetHF_dummy 0.865  (0.002)*** .289 3.466 
StavangerHF_dummy 0.424  (0.002)*** .457 2.189 
FonnaHF_dummy 0.387 (0.002)*** .446 2.245 
BergenHF_dummy 0.356 (0.001)*** .419 2.388 
FørdeHF_dummy 0.331 (0.001)*** .359 2.788 
SunmøreHF_dummy 0.861 (0.001)*** .479 2.089 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 0.805 (0.001)*** .491 2.037 
StOlavsHF_dummy 0.759 (0.001)*** .353 2.835 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy 0.726 (0.001)*** .328 3.052 
HelgelandHF_dummy 0.917 (0.001)*** .415 2.410 
NordlandHF_dummy 0.871 (0.001)*** .381 2.625 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 0.829 (0.001)*** .307 3.253 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 0.791 (0.001)*** .305 3.274 
 *** = p<0.01      ** = p< 0.05    * = p<0.1 
  = Beta  coefficients 
 XX 
 
Model 4A: Public-Private mix 
(without disagggregation) B (Std. Error) Tolerance VIF 
 (Constant) 9.613 (0.151)*** 
  
andel_fastleger 0.650 (0.173)*** .254 3.944 
reisetid_pub 0.000 (0.000)*** .312 3.207 
reisetidpriv       -0.000 (0.000) .242 4.128 
Bruttoinnt 2.944 (1.746)* .280 3.571 
Andel_0_15 0.004 (0.003) .157 6.376 
Andel_45_66 0.009 (0.002)*** .295 3.392 
Andel_67_79 -0.016 (0.003)*** .245 4.074 
Andel_80ogover 0.009 (0.003)** .258 3.874 
andel_ufor 0.018 (0.002)*** .281 3.553 
andel_alenebo80 -0.009 (0.012) .110 9.068 
andel_skilsmisser -0.243 (0.098)** .173 5.777 
andel_dødelighet -0.027 (0.161) .162 6.165 
andel_ensligeforsørgere -0.000 (0.009) .115 8.658 
andel_ikkevinnv -0.031 (0.074) .805 1.242 
andel_kungrskole 0.007 (0.024) .474 2.111 
andel_psykuføre 0.008 (0.028) .618 1.617 
andel_sosialhjelp 0.005 (0.010) .284 3.518 
andel_barnevernstiltak 0.013 (0.029) .174 5.748 
andel_sykepenger -0.003 (0.003) .242 4.135 
Dummy_priv 0.018 (0.009)** .541 1.848 
ØstfoldHF_dummy -0.066 (0.020)*** .493 2.029 
AskerBærumOsloHF_dummy 0.005 (0.023) .768 1.302 
InnlandetHF_dummy -0.013 (0.004)*** .240 4.158 
RingerikeHF_dummy 1.726 (0.005)*** .584 1.711 
BuskerudHF_dummy 1.445 (0.005)*** .793 1.261 
BlefjellHF_dummy 1.23 (0.003)*** .453 2.209 
VestfoldHF_dummy 1.075 (0.003)*** .549 1.822 
TelemarkHF_dummy 0.955 (0.003)*** .669 1.494 
SørlandetHF_dummy 0.857 (0.002)*** .309 3.235 
StavangerHF_dummy 0.424 (0.002)*** .466 2.145 
FonnaHF_dummy 0.388 (0.002)*** .452 2.214 
BergenHF_dummy 0.357 (0.001)*** .431 2.321 
FørdeHF_dummy 0.333 (0.001)*** .354 2.824 
SunmøreHF_dummy 0.862 (0.001)*** .468 2.135 
NordmøreRomsdalHF_dummy 0.806 (0.001)*** .490 2.042 
StOlavsHF_dummy 0.758 (0.001)*** .353 2.832 
NordTrøndelagHF_dummy 0.724 (0.001)*** .327 3.057 
HelgelandHF_dummy 0.914 (0.001)*** .402 2.488 
NordlandHF_dummy 0.868 (0.001)*** .370 2.700 
NordNorgeHF_dummy 0.825 (0.001)*** .265 3.776 
FinnmarkHF_dummy 0.788 (0.001)*** .300 3.330 
*** = p<0.01      ** = p< 0.05    * = p<0.1 
  = Beta  coefficients 
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